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Neil asked:

Does a Jehovah's witness have the right to refuse a blood transfusion for his/her sick baby?

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Many physicians would be prepared to concede to the parent's refusal to allow their child a blood
transfusion, provided that the life of the infant was not in imminent danger. This implies recognition of
the principle that in virtue of a religious objection which the parent holds, but the infant is too young to
hold, one may withhold treatment from the infant which would, were it to be applied, be of positive
benefit. In other words, the infant does not have the absolute moral right to the best treatment on
offer, irrespective of the religious views of the parent.

However, the line would be drawn in cases where the infant would almost certainly perish if the
treatment was not given. The parent does not have the right to let their child die for the sake of his or
her religious beliefs.

This is the default position, the common sense view. It acknowledges that a person's religious views
are something to be respected, and in that sense valued, even if we do not hold those views
ourselves. It also acknowledges that human life is a pre-eminent value. I believe that the onus of
proof is firmly on the person who rejects this default position, for example, by asserting the Jehovah's
Witnesses right to allow their child to die.

How would the argument go? One might raise the question whether absolutely anything would be
permitted, that did not itself involve harming another human being, in order to save a child's life.
Those of us who are not Jehovah's Witnesses do not see what is wrong with giving a blood
transfusion. However, there may be other things which would arouse our moral repugnance — for
example, putting a human heart or brain in the liquidiser and feeding it to the infant in a bottle — to
the point where we would be prepared to prohibit such a form of treatment being given, even to save
a life. Anyone who is convinced by this example owes the Jehovah's Witness an explanation of why
the repugnance against cannibalism has any more right to respect than the Jehovah's Witnesses
repugnance against 'partaking of blood'.

On the other hand, if we bite the bullet and accept that, under certain circumstances, cannibalism
would be justified on medical grounds, that makes the Jehovah's Witnesses position look rather
stronger. We started off defending blood transfusions, and ended up defending cannibalism! As one
who is prepared to bite the bullet, however, I am not embarrassed by having to make this admission.

Geoffrey Klempner