Melanie asked:

I need help with this question:

1. Identify one philosopher and examine his/her understanding of the term miracle.

2. Examine the arguments which can be used to discredit belief in miracles. In what respects do you
   consider belief in miracles to be strong in spite of these criticisms?

The classic philosopher's text about miracles is by David Hume. It can be found in section 10 of Part
II of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.It is a classic example of his skeptical approach
to philosophical questions; for a good approach to understanding it more fully, I recommend J.L.
Mackie's chapter on miracles in his book The Miracle of Theism.But here is my response to Part I of
Hume's approach as it is more difficult than the secondary arguments he offers later.

A miracle is a 'violation of the laws of nature' according to Hume. We shall look at this notion a bit
more carefully later. But for now I want to look at his testimony argument step by step.

*Weaker evidence can never destroy stronger evidence.

*A wise person proportions her belief to the evidence.

*Some things in our experience happen invariably (e.g. that people die) These invariable experiences
constitute certainties and form the basis of 'laws of nature' — "a firm unalterable [past] experience
has established these laws" as Hume puts it.

*Other things occur less than invariably in our experience (e.g. that people survive cancer). These
variable experiences are probabilities which range in degree from strong (almost always happens) to
weak (very seldom happens).

*The reliability of a human testimony is, from experience, usually strongly probable and as such
amounts to a proof that what is reported really happened. But sometimes this reliability is strongly
improbable (as is always the case in the case of miracles because by definition they are violations of
the laws of nature).

*Therefore (from 3 and 4), when testimony is given from what is different from our invariable
experience, a probability, weak or strong, is opposing a certainty. So, (from I and 2) the wise person
should believe the certainty.

*A miracle is a 'transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity'; therefore there
must be uniform experience against any miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that
definition. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct full proof, ipso facto,
against the existence of any miracle.

What, in effect, Hume is saying is that only if a testimony were so strong that its falsehood would itself
be more miraculous than the supposed miracle should we be convinced of the miracle's occurrence.

Questions to ask of this account include:

*What is a 'law of nature'? Is there a difference between an event which shows the law to be an
inaccurate description of the world, and an event which results from a suspension of a law or an
intrusion into the natural world by an agent such as god or invisible spirit?

*Is Hume's definition of a miracle in need of supplementation particular by the qualification of
"religious significance" so those mere freaks of nature are not called miraculous?

*Can a Humean give adequate content to the notion of a physically impossible event? (On that score,
does Hume have a strong enough line on causation?)

*With what justification can we use the exceptional nature of an event as grounds for rejecting
testimony that the alleged event took place?

*Basing probability on past experience is the wrong way to understand probability — think about coin
tossing!

Question (iv) is the crucial one in assessing and understanding Hume's position, as the argument is
addressed to reports about miracles not to our witnessing them.

I think Hume's argument is a very accurate formal representation of the rationality that we apply in
assessing things people report to us (U.F.O's and all that). When applied to the miracles which he
selects (i.e. biblical reports of miracles and the resurrection) the argument successfully shows these
reports should be rejected in my view. Note that the argument cleverly does not show that miracles
are impossible. It establishes that it would never be reasonable on the basis of reported evidence to
accept a testimony. But if you grant that he and I have never experienced an event so clearly at
variance with what we call laws of nature, the effective practical difference between 'never reasonable
to accept' and 'impossible' is small.

Note that some philosophers and scientists regard the 'laws of nature' as probabilistic. 'Laws'
describe regularities not rules. If this is the right view, then the idea of a violation of a law of nature is
more difficult to defend. Perhaps everything that happens is natural by definition of the fact that it has
happened. Those are some questions to consider.

Adam Gatward