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Caroline asked:

Is existentialism compatible with ethics? (looking at both Sartre's and Beauvoir's differing ideas of
freedom).

============

Sartre was a moral philosopher. As an atheist, Sartre thought there was there no a priori way to
establish the good or God, and because he thought that there is no essence to human nature there
could be no objective principles and, furthermore because of the way Sartre characterises morality,
there can be no moral knowledge. Morality, for Sartre, was a way of being, or an aspect of subjectivity
so his moral stance might be described as inter-subjective. Man's subjectivity is defined by his
relation to others, particularly with respect to guilt, shame and responsibility, which are ethical
concepts.

A person feels shame when he is being looked at and judged. In Being and NothingnessSartre gives
examples of making a vulgar gesture or spying through a keyhole. You might be absorbed in spying
through a keyhole and suddenly become aware of what you are doing, as seen through the
evaluative eyes of others, and this gives rise to shame. There can be no such thing as shame without
other persons. You cannot choose not to feel shame, since shame is in the face of others or an affect
of the being of others. This form of moral description does not interfere with man's ability to choose
what to do or determine what he thinks is right. The awareness of others, bringing a feeling of shame,
is moral consciousness or a consciousness of values, and the individual is free to ignore this
consciousness.

At any one time, genuine alternatives for action are available from which an individual is free to
choose and for which he is responsible for as the "author of the event". As one amongst others, in
possession of a moral consciousness in relation to others, a man may perform what he knows to be
wrong in the eyes of others and he is morally responsible because he is free.

For de Beauvoir, on the other hand, freedom is curtailed by one's having been moulded by the world,
especially society and past history. This implies less moral responsibility. As a feminist, de Beauvoir
felt that she was oppressed rather than free, but limitations to freedom caused by social conditioning
are not incompatible with an ethics based on relations with others. De Beauvoir saw ethics as
emerging from close relationships, such as family, and affinities with others.

Rachel Browne