Shula asked:

I have been reading on various websites about Philosophical Counseling, and controversies within
this new field.

What is the general feeling in the philosophical world regarding this hybrid? Does it have standing?

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As a academic philosopher who is very interested in philosophical counseling and who is doing a bit
of research in the field, my feeling is that the philosophical world has not, as yet, fully recognized
philosophical counseling or granted it much respect. If I'm right about this, the reasons are probably
manifold.

There's a long-standing tendency for theoretical philosophers to denigrate any sort of applied
philosophy and the reasons for this lie and the nature of the work done in each broad area.
Theoretical philosophy often invokes the technical framework of formal logic and conceptual analysis
and usually concerns itself with questions that are dependent on, but multiply removed from, the "Big
Questions" normally associated with philosophy as the classical pursuit of wisdom. "What is the
meaning of life?" for instance, depends upon some notion of meaning, so theoretical philosophy turns
from that question to a closer analysis of meaning itself. But an examination of meaning naturally
leads to a philosophical study of language, the prototype of a meaning-bearing system, and that study
leads to inquiries regarding what words mean, and sooner or later you're at Russell's analysis of
definite descriptions, employing the resources of modern logic to unpack the meaning of "the." So, in
general, theoretical philosophy tends to focus on tiny questions and tends to deal with them in a
technical way. I like theoretical philosophy, so I don't think there's anything wrong with this. Big
pictures are painted with little brushes, and by attending to the narrow questions on which fully
satisfactory answers to the broad questions depend, theoretical philosophy is highly relevant and
extraordinarily important.

But, although no less relevant or important, applied philosophy is different. Since applied philosophy
needs to generate results that are useful now, it can't afford to spend time on narrow, technical issues
at the expense of the messy and immediate questions posed by life in all its urgency.

This difference between theoretical and applied philosophy has two implications which often, but
unfairly, reflect poorly upon the latter. First, the complex and dirty problems engaged by applied
philosophy almost never admit of simple and clean solutions, with the result that attempts to think
about sloppy problems can all too easily be confused with sloppy thinking. Second, because the
issues addressed by applied philosophy are multiply-removed from the classic questions which serve
as portals to philosophy, because an approach to those issues often requires the apparatuses of
formal logics of various kinds, because the issues of applied philosophy are more immediately
accessible, and because work in formal logic is less dependent upon the explicit application of
technical training, applied philosophers can have a hard time understanding the work of theoretical
philosophers, whereas theoretical philosophers can usually comprehend the work of applied
philosophers. I've found that, in general, when person A can understand person B, but person B can't
understand person A, person A often thinks of himself (or herself) as smarter than person B. Person
B often shares this opinion, notwithstanding that the fact that asymmetry of comprehension need not
imply a corresponding asymmetry of ability. (To see this, suppose that I make up a language all my
own and proceed to speak it in to you. This would show that I'm a lot of things, but "smarter than you"
isn't one of them.)

In general, then, philosophical counseling might never get the respect it deserves, or would like to
enjoy, simply in virtue of its applied nature. As of this writing, however, I suspect that philosophical
counseling is much worse off than this, and that academic philosophy is reluctant to even recognize
philosophical counseling as a bona fide, but budding, twig on even its most applied branch. For one
thing, philosophical counseling is new and there's always a justified concern that anything new is a
flash in the pan. For another thing, some of the work in philosophical counseling really is third-rate, in
my estimation, and there's no univocal conception of what philosophical counseling should be.
Finally, there's the feeling that, in philosophical counseling, applied philosophy has at last gone over
the edge into a touchy-feely morass of self-help treacle from which no clear and critical thought can
escape. I'm not terrifically troubled by any of this. I doubt that philosophical counseling is a fad since
the conviction that an unexamined life is not worth living has roots too deep in the philosophical
tradition. There's third-rate work in all areas of philosophy, and the field of philosophical counseling
continues to attract good minds. Every area of philosophy is home to debates about the nature of that
field. And, as a matter of fact, philosophical counseling is not a sticky-and-sweet-as-molasses
discipline but is, instead, fully amenable to serious, philosophical work.

So, to summarize, I'd have to say that philosophical counseling is often ignored (at worst) and
disrespected (at best) by academic philosophy, but that this situation shouldn't distress anyone
interested in the field. It's still the new kid on the block and can expect to get its ears boxed a few
times before it gains acceptance. And, as a type of applied philosophy, it may always be dismissed by
philosophers in thrall to the arcane. Outside the academy, however, philosophical counseling may
just make philosophy relevant again.

Dona Warren
Department of Philosophy
The University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point