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Jigs asked:
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Any assistance with these questions would be most appreciated:
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*What is truth and how do we measure it in philosophically?
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*Does the conscious part of the mind control/influence the brain? if so, how can philosophy be
deemed scientific?
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*Can we conclude with Feyerabend in his Against Method that anything goes such as voodoo,
astrology, God, etc. since these standpoints are just as valid as scientific ones, i.e. astronomy,
physics, etc.?
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============
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- The most accepted theory of truth among philosophers is called "the correspondence theory."
According to the correspondence theory of truth, truth is a two-term relation (dyadic relation) between
on the one hand, a belief, or a sentence or statement, or even a theory; and, on the other hand, a fact
or a state of affairs in the world. This relation is called "correspondence" between the first term of the
relation and the second term of the relation. So, for instance, (to take a favorite philosophical
example) the statement (belief etc.) "The cat is on the mat" is true if and only if there is some fact of
state of affairs such that there is a cat, and a mat, and the cat has the relationship of being on the
mat. In that case, the statement in the example "corresponds" with the fact. If, on the other hand,
there were a cat but no mat; or a mat but no cat; or there were a cat, and a mat, but the mat was on
the cat, (and so on) the statement in the example would not correspond to the facts, and the
statement would be false. Just how to understand this relationship of "correspondence" is a
considerable problem in epistemology.
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The next issue is, of course, supposing we understand this correspondence relation, how to
"measure" it, or rather, how to establish that it obtains, is another issue in epistemology. That is, the
question of how we establish in different cases, whether or not a statement does correspond with the
facts. There are cases in which this is not at all straightforward. For instance, consider
"counterfactual" hypothetical statements, as for example, "If that were a dog, then it would bark" when
I am pointing at a cat.
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- I do not quite understand what you are asking. To start with you are assuming that the mind is one
thing, and the brain is a different thing. Many philosophers (and physiologists) would disagree, and
say that hold that the mind was identical with at least some part of the brain, or some function of the
brain, so that there is no question of the mind's control of the brain.
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In the second place, it is not clear to me how this question, however you answer it, connects with
whether or not philosophy is scientific. This is partly because, in turn, I don't know just what you mean
by philosophy being scientific. Philosophy is not, I think, a science like physics or biology. Like any
subject that requires careful thinking, and attention to detail, philosophy also requires such qualities
too. But why should this requirement conflict with the mind's control of the brain (given there is such a
thing)?
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- According to you, Feyerabend presents the following argument:
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(1) Voodoo, astrology, God, etc. are "standpoints" which are just as "valid" as scientific standpoint
such as astronomy, physics, etc.
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Therefore, (2) "Anything goes" (meaning that voodoo and so on) are sources of knowledge about the
world as established science.
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My answer would be, no. My reason is that the above argument is unsound because the premise (1)
is clearly false. There is absolutely no reason to believe it is true, and much to disbelieve it. I find it
peculiar that so obvious a fact even needs to be argued for. But it is well discussed in David Stove's
Anything Goes: The origins of the cult of scientific irrationalism.
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Let me just repeat here David Stove's first two sentences from his first Chapter:
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(1) Much more is known now than it was fifty years ago, and much more was known then than
in 1580. So, (2) there has been a great accumulation or growth of knowledge in the last four
hundred years.
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Notice, that in contrast to the argument you gave above, this argument is sound. The premise (1) is
clearly true, and (2) the conclusion clearly follows from the premise. Therefore, the conclusion is
clearly true.
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Does anyone seriously believe that had we still been, and if we were now, using voodoo, astrology,
and religion instead of physics and astronomy, we would have known and would know now, what we
have known, and do know now?
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Kenneth Stern
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