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Kim asked:
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How dow we know that Socrates' philosophies are that of his own when Plato wrote the dialogues? Is
it not possible that ones perception could vary from another's, thus leading to a misguided or incorrect
translation?
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============
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Your question expresses a central problem in Plato scholarship. We are quite sure that Socrates
himself never wrote anything (at least that we have). From a little external evidence, but mostly
internal evidence, most scholars are agreed that the early dialogues like Apology or Crito are closest
to Socrates' own thought, unadulterated with Plato's views. The "Middle Dialogues" starting with the
Meno and ending with Republic and Theaetetus in which Plato's central metaphysical doctrine of the
Forms is introduced and expounded begin to use Socrates more and more as a spokesman for
Plato's own philosophy. The later dialogues like Timaeus and Parmenides are thought to be
expressions of Plato's thought alone. It is very unlikely that Socrates had the views expressed in the
later or even the doctrine of the Forms in the middle dialogues. These views are too "synoptic" to fit
what we know of Socrates' mostly analytical way of thinking.
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I don't see why mistranslation itself is made particularly possible by any ignorance of the distinction
between the views of Socrates and Plato. Translation is, after all, mostly dependent on the knowledge
and aptitude of the translator. ("To translate" goes a French saying "is to betray," but even so, there
are degrees of betrayal.) But I agree that the interpretation of what is translated is, guided to a large
extent, by our beliefs (what you call "perceptions") concerning the relative core views of the two
philosophers. It is always possible that we are mistaken: whether it is probable that we are is a
different matter, and it is probability that counts.
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Kenneth Stern
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