David asked:

I am curious about the relationship between knowledge and belief. One person I know argues that
belief is a requirement for knowledge, in the sense that "X knows Y" entails that "X believes Y to be
true." It seems to me that this is unnecessary and that it misrepresents the cognitive process:
ordinarily one does not consider that one "believes" what one "knows" (e.g. I do not say that I believe
the world is round if I know the world is round or that I believe my name is David if I know my name is
David). What is the reigning philosophical position on this question?

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It is true that it would be misleading when asked a question to saythat we believe something when
we know that thing. Just as it would be misleading to say when asked how many people there are in a
room that there were 10 people in a room when in fact we knew there were 20. It is a condition of
"assertibility" that in normal conditions, we should not give less information than we have when asked
for the information. But "assertibility" conditions of communication are not the same thing as
truth-conditions. So, if there are 20 people in a room, we are asserting what is true when we say there
are 10 people in the room, since if there are 20 then there are 10. In the same way, even if we ought
not to say we believe something is true when we know it is true, it does not follow that when we know
something we do not also believe that thing.

Of course, we should not say that there are only10 people in the room when there are 20, and very
often our saying there are 10 people may be understood as our saying that there are only10 people
because of the conversational rule that it is expected that we give all the information we have when
asked; similarly, if we say we believe something when we know it, that will be interpreted as only
believing it for the same reason. But clearly, when I say there are 10 people even when there are 20,
I am speaking the truth: and when I say, "I believe" even when I know, I am speaking the truth too.

After all, to believe some proposition p, is to accept that p is true. And when I know that p, I must be
accepting the truth of p. So, I think your friend is right, although your objection is interesting and
answering it brings out important points. (Some of the best philosophy consists in making mistakes.)

There is a different objection to the view that knowledge entails belief that is also pretty interesting.
Suppose a schoolboy who knows the answer to the question, "In what year did the Normans invade
England" (1066) is so intimidated by the teacher who asks the question, that he replies very hesitantly
"The date was 1066." Does the schoolboy not believethe answer even though he knowsit? Think
about it first, and then look at my answer:

My answer is, yes, the schoolboy does know the answer and so, does believe the answer. But, he
does not believe he knows the answer. What do you think about that?

Kenneth Stern