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Tiffany asked:

Can you tell me if affirmative action is a form of discrimination?

============

I assume you mean to ask whether affirmative action — introducing a deliberate bias towards the
recruitment of members of minorities or other disadvantaged groups — is a form of unfair or
unjustified discrimination. By definition, affirmative action is a form of discrimination, hence the term
sometimes used, 'positive discrimination'.

(By the way, I don't like the term 'affirmative action'. It is a euphemism, a term used by people who
are not prepared to call a spade a spade.)

Consider one argument in favour of positive discrimination. The governors of a school with a high
proportion of children from underprivileged black neighbourhoods institute a policy of deliberate bias
towards the recruitment of black teachers, on the grounds that black teachers will serve as better role
models. Following this policy, a black teacher might beat a more able, or better qualified white
teacher to a post, on the basis of skin colour alone.

Can that be justified?

I believe that it can. The crucial question is which teachers would be the bestin the context in which
they were required to teach. 'Best' means most effective, most likely to produce beneficial results for
the pupils in their charge. Thus, a teacher who was qualified to the hilt might be less effective in a
given situation than one who had lower qualifications, but other virtuesnot possessed by the better
qualified teacher. Few would have any quarrel with that.

Most would agree that skin colour is not a 'virtue' in this sense. It is not an attribute with any intrinsic
worth.
Its value in a given situation is merely extrinsic and consequential, the result of the way a
teacher's having that skin colour will be perceived. Yet that is sufficient, I would argue, to demonstrate
that skin colour alone can be a relevant, justifiable consideration. There is no axiomatic rule of justice
according to which the teacher with the highest 'intrinsic virtue' automatically deserves to gain the
post. The students' needs are paramount.

My conclusion is the modest one that affirmative action or positive discrimination can sometimes be
justified. The case of positive discrimination I have described is consistent with the demands of
justice. I am fully prepared to allow, however, that there may also be real life cases where positive
discrimination is unjust, and therefore unjustified.

Geoffrey Klempner