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Sylvia asked:

Could you explain Hume's argument that it is beyond human understanding to know the causes of
events, even the everyday ones.

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You seem to be somewhat confused about Hume's views on causation. It is true that, according to
Hume, our beliefs about causes and effects can never be rationally proven, in the sense which leaves
no possible room for doubt. Yet in his Treatise of Human NatureHume describes eight 'Rules to
judge of cause and effect' (Book I, Section xv) which we would recognize today as the application of
sound scientific method. We can be wrong about causes and effects, because the cause of an event
may be unobvious. The apparent cause may not be the real cause. However, this is an error which
the proper application of Hume's 'Rules' allows us to rectify.

Where, famously, Hume attacked the notion of causation was in the false metaphysical assumptions
which the ordinary or 'vulgar' notion implied. According to Hume, all the evidence we have for any
event or connection between events consists in successions of sense data or 'impressions'. On this
strict empiricist basis, Hume asks where we derive the idea of a 'necessary connection' between
cause and effect; for example, one pool ball hitting another, or a stone hitting a pane of glass and
breaking it. The extra factor which is the actual causal linkcannot be perceived. All we see is one
event, then another event. So what can we possibly meanwhen we say that the first event caused
the second event — for example, the impact of the white ball caused the red ball to go into the corner
pocket; the stone caused the glass to shatter?

Hume's answer is profound and revolutionary. The truth of a statement of the form 'A caused B'
consists in the truth of a universal generalization.In allplaces, and at alltimes, a state of affairs which
fits the description of B will follow from a state of affairs which fits the description of A. The impact of a
red and white pool ball, or a stone and glass will alwaysproduce the same result — provided that the
speeds, weights and other surrounding circumstances are the same. We may never be able to
duplicate these circumstances exactly. But this is what we meanwhen we talk of causation.
Causation is nothing but 'constant conjunction'.

There are reasons to be worried by this account. Despite the great power of the idea of a universal
generalization covering indefinitely many instances, you may feel that something has been lost in the
analysis. The particular relation of 'bringing about' or 'making' between one unique event and another
has been replaced by a relation between general descriptions. One thing happens; then another. All
that we see, according to Hume, is all that is there in reality. The extra causal link that we believe to
exist between the two events, consists merely in the fact that events of the first kind are 'constantly
conjoined' with events of the second. Our intuitions ought to be affronted by that claim. However, it is
no easy matter finding a satisfactory alternative to Hume's analysis.

Geoffrey Klempner