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Geoffrey asked:

Could you explain Richard Rorty's views on truth?

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Richard Rorty believes there is no special key to catch the true reading from a text, like someone
might have a secret number to open a security box. But he didn't say that we can't have in our houses
a security box filled with several secret numbers. In my opinion — a opinion that I think as respecting
Rorty — there are good keys and bad keys.

Let me first deal with bad reading. It appears in the hands of a kind of neomarxist or a hard analytic
philosopher, or a foolish professor of Philosophy. A man or woman thinking the following: "if there are
no right key to get the truth on a text then Rorty is saying that the truth is something we will not to
know and then Rorty is a skeptical philosopher — this is my conclusion!" Or: "if Rorty is saying that
there is not the right key to know the truth in a text then he doesn't believe in the true sentences or
utterances, and this is a contradiction, a bad formulation — I needn't believe him because what he is
telling doesn't make sense." Newspapers and books and universities keep a lot of people thinking in
this way.

Let me deal with better readings. It is natural position of a smart professor of Philosophy. He knows: "I
didn't study Rorty but what he is telling is (in the) the central debate in Philosophy nowadays: the
dispute of theories of truth." He is right because of that: Rorty wants to overcome the polemic realism
versus anti-realism or the conversation about the truth. But he is a philosopher and he needs to be
understood among his peers. So, Rorty is seeking for a new paradigm but he is avoiding a
Nietzschean hole. If he starts to talk like Nietzsche, for example "there are only interpretations", he
doesn't get to make a step; nowadays he needs to choose the technical and correct language of
Philosophy from the departments of Philosophy, and he has to keep waiting until someone without
prejudices catches what he is saying. Shortly, Rorty talks about the debate between two theories of
truth: the strong position coming from the theory of correspondence and the several positions coming
from the contemporary and minimalist theories.

This is a new point, but this is not a completely unpublished point in other times. Bertrand Russell
attacked William James using a theory of correspondence of truth against the pragmatist theory of
truth. It was a good attack. Horkheimer did a similar thing but his text now appears boring and the
words incorrect. Since that time the pragmatist walked in a inferior position. But after the Second
World War Quine animated the issue. Texts written previously by Ramsey and Wittgenstein
appeared. Donald Davidson became a famous philosopher. And Paul Horwith wrote a lot of text on
the minimalist position. Rorty's neopragmatism in this field, as Rorty himself says, is a position
swinging between an old pragmatist opinion and a minimalist opinion about truth. For Rorty sees a
bridge between the old James' opinion and the possibilities of the post linguistic-turn approach made
by minimalist philosophers.

I wrote several books in Portuguese where I tried to show this: O que você precisa saber em
Filosofia da Educação, published by DP&A ( http://www.dpa@dpa.com.br)and Richard
Rorty: a filosofia do Novo Mundo em busca de mundo novospublished by Vozes
( http://www.vozes.com.br). Here I don't have space to explain this. So, I will just put our schema:

What are the theories of truth telling us?

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Correspondence Theory: x is true iff x corresponds to fact.

*
Coherence Theory: x is true if, and only if x is a member of a fitted and harmonic set of sentences.

*
Pragmatist Theory: x is true if, and only if x is useful for us to believe.

*
A kind of, say, Piercean Theory: x is true if, and only if x is probable or x can pass through verification
under ideal conditions.

All theories above are traditional theories. They work (or not) regarding a kind of ontological point. Of
course, it is obvious in the correspondence theory, but the other cases are not completely unattached
with such a point of view. That is, all theories above will go a following way: they put linguistic
elements in a side and non linguistic elements on other side. And the problem is: all theories meet a
gulf between both sides. The solutions for this gulf, that is a bridge or a similar thing is a trouble and
they are a part of the History of Philosophy. And this History and its gulf brought the idea that there
was something mysterious around the truth: what is the nature of the Truth?

Frank Ramsey said a thing before thirty years and it helped nowadays: minimalist theories. We won't
talk about Ramsey — if he was or not an adept of correspondence theory. What is important is: he
shows a kind of ladder (I took this idea coming from Simon Blackburn). We can say: "It is true that p",
in the beginning; "It is a fact that it is true that p", in the first step; "It is really a fact that it is true that
p", in the next step; and we can say after several sentences: "it corresponds to the eternal
mathematical (or normative) order governing the universe that p". Ramsey taught us a thing: we use
our words and sentences for a success in the communication process. It is a case of good
performance and bad performance. Then the "truth" and "true" are in this to help us to have a good
performance in a linguistic game. Because you and I can say "It is true that eagles can fly" and such
a utterance is telling us just "eagles fly". The "true" here is a good tool for our performance in our
communication. But we can give it up.

When the minimalism appeared with that card it didn't solve the gulf, but it opened a door: we can
think "truth" or "true" are not mysterious things. They are linked to linguistic performance in
communication process. By the way it would be the same as William James said when he put "the
truth is what is good of us to believe". It is a good word, useful in a game when we talk about all
things of the world. Ramsey could be read like a pragmatist philosopher. And it is the point that we
need to see Rorty as a stripper. But if we take another way... oh! I believe that we will not get a naked
Rorty. And we won't understand Rorty.

Paulo Ghiraldelli Jr.
Universidade Estadual Paulista
Marília City
São Paulo, Brazil
http://www.filosofia.pro.br