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Brian asked:

This is a question about dualism. Can the mind be split like a physical part of the body can? If you
remove certain parts of the brain will certain parts of the mind no longer exist, and can they be
relearned without the necessary parts of the brain?

============

This is a very good insight into the mind-body problem, and one which has always prompted me to
exhort that philosophers study neurology. In answer to your first question: yes. In answer to your
second: for the most part, no.

Now, what are the implications? Suppose the mind is a "nonmaterial substance", whatever that might
be, which is not generated by the brain, but is somehow associated with it, so that when we physically
die, that mind just floats off somewhere. Why then, given the enormousvariety of brain damage in the
literature, do we see the extremelyspecific, long-lasting (i.e., largely irreversible) effects that we do in
fact see? Well, one possibility is that the mind, the "nonmaterial" substance, could also be destroyed
by the damage. But that seems to contradict the whole point of mind/brain independence. Another
alternative is that the mind is still there, but it's lost some sort of connection to the brain. Well, in that
case, why don't we see an effect like that of static on the radio: the program is still broadcasting, but
we just can't receive it properly? But that is notwhat we see in brain damage; we see fundamental
problems generating or constructing the mental events or acts that are associated with the affected
area of the brain: the program is not being broadcast(i.e., constructed, in this case). But how can that
be, if the mind is basically independent of the brain? Well, I don't have the slightest idea. The concept
of dependence is preciselywhat we see being realized in this kind of phenomenon: if something (M)
is dependent on something else (B), then if M is damaged, B is not necessarily affected, but if B is
damaged, M isnecessarily affected. Well, that's the case with the mind (M) vs. the brain (B).

Now, if you stillwant to insist that the mind is another substance from the brain, but concede that it is
affected by brain damage, fine. I don't see what distinction is being made here, though. You're going
to live after you die physically? Um... live how? If the brain is completelydestroyed, with organic
death, and the mind, whatever it is, is dependent on the brain, then allyour memories are gone
(hypothalamus/cortex, mostly), allyour capacity for rational thought (cortex and prefrontal lobes,
mostly), allyour capacity for emotions (thalamus, mostly), and in fact your consciousness... gone. So
whatever floats away surely isn't you; you — your memories, thoughts, feelings — are all destroyed
with your brain. Everything I've listed here (and this is a very minimal list, but come up with a mental
function, and a neuroanatomist, at this point, can pretty much tell you where it's located) is associated
with various parts of the brain, including consciousness (that latter is dependent on what is known as
the "extended reticular activating system"; when that is destroyed, you go into irreversible coma).
Creativity? Prefrontal/cortical function, mostly. Look at the literature on Nicholas Gage, for example,
or at Damasio's book, "Descartes' Error", which addresses this topic, mostly as it relates to emotion,
in great detail.

Steven Ravett Brown