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Amy asked:

Does a clone have 'knowledge' as it only has its original's experiences?

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A biological clone of a human being would not have any knowledge or experience, because the clone
only reproduces the genetic information carried in the body cells. The brain state of the individual who
is cloned is not included in that information. However, we can imagine a science fiction scenario
where it was possible to scan a person's body and create a perfect replica, so that brain states were
replicated along with bodily structure.

First we need to find a suitable subject to experiment on. Suppose we put Einstein in the replicating
machine. As the switch is pulled, a second 'Einstein' materializes in the empty booth alongside the
booth where Einstein is sitting. At the moment when the second Einstein has fully materialized, all his
experiences, or rather, all that he remembers of his experiences derives from the original Einstein.
From that moment onwards, however, the replica Einstein is capable of having his own experiences
which are different from the experiences had by the original Einstein.

Now, if we ask the Einstein replica questions about physics or mathematics, we can be certain that
the answer he gives will be as good as those that the original Einstein would give. Pretty hard, then,
to argue that the replica Einstein does not have 'knowledge' of tensor calculus or relativity theory!

Now suppose we ask the Einstein replica, "What were you doing last Sunday lunchtime?" The replica
replies, "I had lunch with my good friend Niels Bohr at the Bistro d'Agran." We know that this cannot
be true. The replica Einstein did not exist last Sunday, and therefore his belief that he had lunch with
Niels Bohr is most certainly false.

However, even though the replica Einstein has this false belief, we still feel tempted to say that he
knows what was on the special menu at the Bistro d'Agranlast Sunday lunchtime. If we ask him, he
will give exactly the same answer as the one given by the original Einstein.

But does he really know this? The difference between this case and the questions about mathematics
and physics, is that here we are dealing with knowledge of particulars, that is to say, facts concerning
things that exist at specific places and times. The replica Einstein has a belief about the menu at a
Bistro somewhereand somewhenbut there is nothing to logically link the replica Einstein's belief to
the actual Bistro, existing at a specific time and place, corresponding to the actual historical path that
connects Albert sipping Borscht with his friend Neil, and the nervous subject in the booth awaiting the
throw of the switch. That is why philosophers of language would argue (it must be admitted, against
one's untutored intuitions) that the replica Einstein does not know what was on the special menu at
the Bistro d'Agranlast Sunday lunchtime, even though the answer he gives appears to be correct.

Geoffrey Klempner