Sara asked:

I have to write an essay for my philosophic logic course on Kripke on names. How does Kripke attack
the 'Frege — Russell' theory of names? Do Kripke's objections work? Also what is the relevance of
Kripke's claim that all proper names are 'rigid designators'? Finally what is the causal theory of
reference?

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I have written about Kripke in these pages before so you could look at my answer to Ravi on Answers
page 11.

Assuming you have read that, then you can do you own further work for your essay. Doubts about
Kripke's theory can be found in Gareth Evans book The Varieties of Referencep. 75.

J.S. Mill in A System of Logicput forward a causal theory of reference. On this approach to reference
a name is attached to a person and used as a device for direct reference free of descriptive
attachment. In Naming and Necessity,Kripke also mentioned the "historical chain of communication"
but I'm not sure how strictly causal these theories are, since a chain of communication is only really
causal in conjunction with a physicalist theory of mind.

Rachel Browne