Jean (Mr) asked:

I' m considering to join one of Dr. Klempner 's programs and I just read your Pathways Postcard:

""Empty is the argument of the philosopher which does not relieve any human suffering" (Epicurus)."

Of course. But, may I ask, what about animal suffering? Who should relieve animal suffering? Or,
maybe, this suffering should not matter for the philosopher?

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I cited Epicurus in the English standard translation using the term suffering,which would mean Leiden
in German, where Leidenis something that just happens to me, being imposed upon me.

In contrast the German translation of Epicurus normally uses the term Leidenschaft,being an active
human quality, meaning passionor emotionin English. I must admit I felt a difference between these
translations, but didn't very thoroughly think about it and animal suffering didn't even come to my
mind citing Epicurus.

Well, I'll try to explain, why:

As I learned from Merriam-Webster, etymologically speaking, suffering and passion do have the
same roots in the Latin passio,meaning suffering, being acted upon, from Latin patito suffer. But the
problem is, that the term passion besides it's original sense is equivocally used in some other senses,
which sound typical human to me:

Passions

1. as emotions: "his ruling passion is greed" (plural the emotions as distinguished from reason

2. an outbreak of anger

3. ardent affection

4. a strong liking or desire for or devotion to some activity, object, or concept

5. sexual desire

6. an object of desire or deep interest

(This of course doesn't mean, that animals can't have emotions, or desires.)

If Epicurus had used passion in the sense of passive suffering, you would be right asking "What about
the suffering of animals?" and in this sense animal suffering does matter to philosophers, as (passive)
suffering applies to both humans and animals.

But I think, Epicurus meant the typical human active "worldly passions" of for example desire and
greed, which Epicurus considers as diseases of our souls and puts these in contrast to physical
diseases. In this case it is the task of philosophy to cure that human disease by severing the ties of
worldly passion which is the sole cause of suffering. As these "worldly passions" do not apply to
animals, suffering in this second sense applies only to humans.

By the way, Epicurus is often cited in "philosophical counselling" which is seen by some of its
supporters as a complement to psychotherapy, and as this complementary philosophy is definitely
back in the business of relieving humansuffering.

Simone Klein