Tarhan asked:

What is the connection between human agreement and truth in Wittgenstein's philosophy?

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Wittgenstein was not a solipsist. He understood that there was a world at large which contained other
humans. He did however show some sympathy for the solipsistic view, in so much as he was aware
of the difficulties involved in making direct contact with other minds, hence 'actual' proof of the
existence of other minds is not forthcoming. We can never be acquainted with other people's
experiences, though most of us are inclined to believe that others experience the same sorts of things
that we do ourselves.

Wittgenstein approaches a solution by way of language; language itself is essentially social, it may be
necessary for cognition purposes, i.e. thinking, judging, making decisions, etc., but it is essential for
communication between minds. Without language humanity would be confined to drawing
conclusions about other minds and mental states by dependence on, what has been called, "a dodgy
inference from behaviour."

When discussing truth in Wittgenstein's philosophy we are immediately confined within the bounds of
his world view. Problems arise from his insistence that the world is the totality of facts, not of things.
Herein lies the importance of language in Wittgenstein's philosophy. For example, a tree is a 'thing' to
be observed and to be pointed at, on the other hand a boy climbing a tree is a fact which can only be
stated or asserted in language. Pointing at a boy climbing a tree could not make us aware of the
intention. Description of 'meaning' is required, and this can only come through language.

I believe that Wittgenstein would agree that truth could be discussed within the context of his
language games: in fact he would probably adhere to the general view that a sentence/ statement is
true if and only if what it says corresponds to the facts, or to reality. ( However we must bear in mind
what Wittgenstein means by facts and reality .) The essential point about this definition is that
whether or not sentences/ statements are true depends in some way or other on the world.

Can we be certainabout things in the world? Wittgenstein says, "I act with complete certainty. But this
certainty is my own." Again he is pointing out that he cannot claim certainty for others, nor can others
claim certainty for him; it is, therefore, in cases like this that we must bring in the notion of agreement.
Agreement can be reached by playing a language game. If we are using language, i.e. making
statements, posing propositions, etc.,we must be referring to facts. However, within the parameters
laid down by Wittgenstein, when I express certainty about something in the world, or state what I am
certain is the truth, my statement must not only correspond with the fact but to be in agreement it
must also correspond with statements made by others.

As we would expect with a complex philosophy like that of Wittgenstein, the simple description of
'agreement' I have outlined is only exposing the tip of the iceberg. Complications arise when
discussing alleged historical truths, alleged scientific truths, and so on. Perhaps the following
statement by Wittgenstein sums up what I mean. 'If everything speaks foran hypothesis and nothing
against it, is it objectively certain?One can callit that. But does it necessarilyagree with the world of
facts? At the very best it shows us what "agreement " means. We find it difficult to imagine it to be
false, but also difficult to make use of it. What does this agreement consist in, if not in the fact that
what is evidence in these language games speaks for our proposition.'

Quotes from On CertaintyLudwig Wittgenstein, (Basil Blackwell . Oxford)

John Brandon