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Pete asked:

How do you know if you are "right" about anything? On an absolute basis? In that process, how would
you define "right?"

============

The question you are asking is not about 'right' and 'wrong' in the sense of, 'She did the right thing',
'His action was wrong' but rather in the sense of, 'What she said was right', 'He was wrong to imply
that'. In other words, we are concerned with the meaning of 'right' as applied to statements.

The definition is surprisingly easy:

"X's statement (or judgement, implication etc.) that P is rightif, and only if P."

For example, Tony Blair's statement that the UK economy has successfully escaped the world
recession is rightif and only if the UK economy has successfully escaped the world recession.
Economists and political analysts might wrangle about the state of the UK economy, or the success of
Blair's economic policies. It may be very difficult to decide with certainty whether Blair isright on this
particular question. But that is another matter. What being right about something meansis that you
say, or think such-and-such and you're right: it issuch-and-such.

This is hardly news. The definition I have just given is the same definition that one would give for the
predicate, 'is true':

"X's statement (or judgement, implication etc.) that P is trueif and only if P."

The hard question is how we can every know'the truth' about anything. Indeed, are we ever justified
in asserting something astrue? Or, in your terms, are we ever justified in claiming to be right?

On my Glass House Philosopher notebook page 130 I give four arguments for scepticismany one of
which, if valid, would suffice to show that we are never justified in claiming to be right. I leave it to you
to decide whether any of those arguments are convincing, or, if so, whether one could escape the
grip of the sceptical conclusion by saying, 'I think such-and-such, but I'm not saying I'm right!'

Geoffrey Klempner