Lindsay asked:

What did Ludwig Wittgenstein say about belief and knowledge? How would he have responded to
statements such as:

"I believe I am sitting in this chair vs. I know I am sitting on this chair."

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Wittgenstein had quite a lot to say about belief and knowledge; as would be expected from a thinker
who fundamentally changed the course of modern philosophy. Though influential, Wittgenstein can
be described as a baffling thinker, very much a philosopher's philosopher. His theory of knowledge
and belief is deep and intricate, and, like much of his philosophy can be misinterpreted and
misunderstood. My first reading as a student was something of a culture shock.

Wittgenstein regards the concept 'I know' as personal, and in the 'mental world' of the person
expressing it. Hence he might respond to "I know I am sitting in this chair" by saying, "To me that is a
meaningless statement." Meaningless in the sense that he cannot be aware of yoursensory
experience and what sitting in a chair means in your perspective. He in turn might say, "I observe an
event — or a state of affairs," which, on reflection, he confirms to be a person sitting in a chair. To
'know' there is a person sitting in a chair mental acts would have to be performed involving memory
and association of things like chairs, and events like sitting etc. before he could say "I know there is a
person sitting in a chair — I am certain of it." He might say that he has acquired a personal
knowledge of someone sitting in a chair, which he finds he is, on past experience, unable to deny.
However, his knowledge of someone sitting in a chair and your knowledge of experiencing sitting in a
chair are still two separate pieces of knowledge. In his writing, Wittgenstein, stresses this point "We
just do not see how very specialised the use of 'I know' is." He goes on to say, "For 'I know' seems to
describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact." We can always
be doubtful of the utterance "I know" when uttered by someone else, but can infer "It is so" when we
ourselves utter "I know."

Wittgenstein asserts that when we or anyone else claim to know anything we require to prove the fact
objectively. We display evidence in the world ' outside ' to prove or support the knowledge contained
in our 'mental/ inner' world. Much of this evidence is made available by our ability to use language. He
claims that we share knowledge by engaging in ' language games.' It is always important to describe
howwe know something. This helps us to accept or challenge knowledge claimed by others.

To return to your question and the utterance, "I believe I am sitting in this chair." I think that
Wittgenstein would find this to be rather strange. He might say that you can believe that you might be
sitting in this chair tomorrow, but to be actually doing something at this point in time, and stating that
you only believe you are doing it, seems ostensibly nonsensical. Wittgenstein regarded, 'to know
something' as being certain of something, but to believe something he understood to be not certain,
belief seems to suggest an element of doubt. To be sitting in a chair and at the same time not being
certain of doing so raises questions about the mental state of the person asserting the belief. Is it not
strange to doubt our immediate experiences? Or could the person be using the concept 'belief' in a
way understood to him/ herself, but not understood by the observer? Again, Wittgenstein might say,
another person cannot know what your belief is, your beliefs are confined to yourself — subjective.
He also might say that the person sitting in the chair is not playing the language game properly, i e
not playing to the rules.

We must appreciate that when Wittgenstein discusses facts he is referring to their location in 'logical
space.' That a person is sitting in a chair is a fact, a chair, on the other hand, is not a fact but a thing.
To him the world is the totality of facts, not of things. Coming to terms with Wittgenstein's world view
presents us with huge problems when trying to discuss his concepts of knowledge and belief.

Quotes are from 'On CertaintyLudwig Wittgenstein (Basil Blackwell, Oxford).

John Brandon