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Claire asked:

I am doing a 6—8 page essay on the ethical issues surrounding vivisection, I am getting along with
this pretty good, but need to apply two or more ethical theories in my paper. I am thinking of using
Utilitarianism and the Categorical Imperative, do you think these would apply well and could you give
me some ideas of how these theories would think and apply to Vivisection.

============

Interesting task.

Utilitarianism is pretty straightforward, at least in theory. Vivisection is morally right if and only if it
leads to greater happiness for a greater number than banning it does. There are, however, a number
of pitfalls in interpreting this. What is happiness? How do we add it up? How do we know what the
sum total of outcomes would be for each alternative? Even more importantly in this case: whose
happiness? Is happiness the sort of thing that animals have?

Peter Singer, who is a type of utilitarian, talks more of minimising suffering than maximising
happiness. Animals clearly suffer. Therefore, the suffering of animals must be considered, and
weighed against any reduction in suffering that research involving vivisection might produce.

Kant's Categorical Imperative has a great deal more difficulty in dealing with moral questions
concerning animals, though some Kantians have advanced ways in which it can. This is because the
CI only seems to deal with rational beings. The Kingdom of Ends version of the CI, for example,
claims that we must treat others as ends and never merely as means. The others referred to here are
other rational beings — those who can impose the Moral Law on themselves.

In this view, we can clearly treat inanimate objects as means. We cannot do the same with humans.
But where do animals fit? They are not inanimate objects. They are not rational beings. Standard
Kantian theory seems to imply that they belong with the objects, and so there is no moral question
concerning vivisection. As I said, some Kantian scholars would dispute this, and Kant himself does
say that we owe some moral duties to animals (though I can't remember the details now). I would
think it is worth your while chasing this up.

Tim Sprod