Felicia asked:

What does Kant's categorical imperative offer to ethics? What are its drawbacks?

What is the advantage of a virtue ethics approach?

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The categorical imperative brings together the idea of the objective requirements imposed upon us by
others and our ability to act towards an end in itself, with the notion of a pure will free of subjective
inclination.

However, I start with the drawbacks. Kant's idea of the rational free will has been criticised on the
ground that it is detached from the motivational will. Normally, an agent acts on reasons that have
some force with him and fit in with his overall goals, desires and intentions (Gilbert Harman in
Relativism Cognitive and Moral). But when we act on the categorical imperative, we simply act
towards an end, performing an act on the basis of duty. Another form of this criticism is that if we
internalise social mores, so that duties become instinctual, we are not acting according to rational
principle but from subjective or personal motivation (Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of
Philosophy). It is also pointed out (Williams) that the categorical imperative doesn't really reflect the
nature of our moral agency and we don't see ourselves as legislators when we act morally and there
doesn't seem to be any reason why we should. On the other hand, some philosophers (Tom Scanlon,
What We Owe to Each Otherand Roger Scruton, Kant) find that the categorical imperative reflects
our moral nature. Firstly, there are the general points that we are governed by rational principles and
we do aim at an ideal ethical community and secondly, our moral intuitions about reverence for
others, the worth of duty, the struggle to overcome desire and that morality is not a matter of
self-interest are reflected in the categorical imperative.

I believe it is understood to be a valid objection to Kant that we don't possess an autonomous rational
will and that we cannot act as abstract rational agents towards an end which is non-hypothetical and
not based upon our own goals or desires. However, Kant's characterisation of the rational will sets up
the principle of the categorical imperative as based on an aspect of our common nature. The
categorical imperative as a maxim is both a principle and a motive and the objection is that it is
cannot be a motive. (There is also the objection that the CI is an empty principle without material
content, but that has been dealt with before on this site and you can look at the search engine at
PhiloSophos.com.)

Personally, I see no problem with the idea that when we act on the categorical imperative, our will is
in accordance with a rationally universalizable principle since it is only then that we are acting without
reference to goals and desires- and this is what a good will is. Sometimes we simply do act for the
good of other persons and it is at such times, that we do not hold reasons that refer to our own
interests and goals. Those who object to this would hold that when we act from non-self-interested
reasons, simply for the benefit of another, this is not grounded in a rational autonomous will, but in
desire or instinct, which for Kant are non-moral since they don't involve obligation. But an instinct
towards an action that could be made into a principle in the form of the categorical imperative is the
nature of the operation of a good will: There is nothing hypothetical or conditional upon desire
involved. The categorical imperative embodies the idea of the purity of morality and this is what Kant
intended when, right at the beginning of the Groundwork, he says that the concept of duty has no
application to a good will. Considerations to do with the autonomous rational will and legislation have
no bearing on particular moral acts, but only function to set up a characterisation of morality as having
a command upon us because of human rational capacity.

A more serious drawback, as far as I'm concerned, is that the categorical imperative has force
because we are rational beings and moral principles are only directed at human beings. If our ethical
attitude to animals is based in compassion and the theory doesn't extend to the recognition of a moral
call from the animal kingdom then it is seriously species-ist.

I'm not sure whether you are saying that Kant's is an ethics of virtue? Duty is regarded as a virtue, but
so are benevolence and compassion and all are Aristotelian virtues of character and need not
underlie the Kantian moral act. As Kant recognises, we are not good all the time, even if we do
develop virtuous qualities. However, it is possible — now and again — for us to act purely and
virtuously. The advantage of Kant's approach to ethics, as I understand it, it is that a highly realistic
description of our moral acts and our moral nature.

Rachel Browne