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Rafaela asked:
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Is the principle of proportionality being applied by the United States in their response to the New York
and Washington terrorists attacks?
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Your question assumes that the US ought to limit itself to a 'proportionate' response. However, the
main line that has been taken is that the terrorist network needs to be eradicated in the interest of
self-protection. In that case, a response which was out of proportion to the original terrorist act might
conceivably be justified on the grounds that it prevented future acts of equal or possibly greater
magnitude.
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To see the problems with this argument, imagine a possible world where owing to a tip-off, the
would-be hijackers were intercepted minutes before they were due to board. Their intentions, and the
intentions of the people who sent them were exactly the same: to take thousands of innocent lives.
But it would surely have been impossible for the USA to have used the incident as justification for the
invasion of Afghanistan. Everyone would have breathed a sigh of relief, and redoubled their efforts to
increase Airport security.
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'Justice' has been spoken about a lot. It is clear, however, that a truly just response would be one
where only the guilty suffered: i.e. hunting down and bringing to trial the actual persons responsible.
Despite the propaganda, therefore, I don't think that what the USA is seeking is justice.
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A third possible role for the idea of proportionality as a prudential rule of warfare. There are two
reasons why, in a war situation which is not all-out war, there might be self-interested reasons for
limiting an aggressive response to an enemy attack to one that is in proportion to the harm caused:
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1. The first rule is familiar to chess players, "A threat is more powerful than its execution." If there is
something you can do, perhaps use type of weapon which you have not yet used, or attack a
particular target, your power over the enemy is greater than if you do use that weapon, or attack that
target.
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2. The second principle acknowledges the importance of winning the peace. The chances of winning
the peace are greater if the victorious side has been seen to exercise self-restraint in its pursuit of
victory.
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It is clear that neither of these principles has played much part in the thinking of the USA in
conducting the invasion of Afghanistan. In their eyes, the terrorists and those supporting the terrorists
seem quite impervious to any threat. For the terrorists, it seems, death at the hands of the hated
enemy is a form of victory. As for winning the peace, how can that even be contemplated in the face
of so implacable a foe?
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If this is true, then the only ground for self-restraint is the moral ground of saving innocent lives.
However, the moral argument is open to the response that, on balance, more innocent lives will be
lost if the war is not taken to the enemy.
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In either case, whether one is considering self-interest or morality, the decisions being taken should
be open to continuous review. The situation is fluid. One may be forced by an unexpected turn of
events to reassess one's view of the psychology of the enemy, or of the consequences in terms of
innocent lives lost of a particular course of action.
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In practice, however, it is very difficult to stop a juggernaut once it has started rolling.
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I also fear that another, more shady principle might be playing a role in the thinking of the US military.
This is the theory which first emerged during the Vietnam war, at the time of President Nixon and
Secretary of State Kissinger: the so-called 'Madman' view. The source of the idea is from game
theory. If you are seen to be rational in the way you conduct a campaign, then the enemy has a
greater chance of predicting your actions, and consequently of manipulating you. So the idea instead
is to convince the enemy that you are completely out of control. You are sufficiently 'mad' to do
anything.
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The problem with this scenario is that you may begin to suspect that your opponent has adopted this
game plan. Then what do you do?
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Geoffrey Klempner
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