Gonzalo asked:

I would like to know if you could provide me with a list of books that you find fundamental to the study
of ethics. I would also like to point out that I am not very familiar with the subject, but I am rather
interested to find out what is all about.

Also, I wanted to ask you if you think that morals, values or traditions present, or, could present
themselves as an obstacle to the development or realizations of the objectives of one's lives. I ask
you this because I want to ask your opinion on the following: I have a friend (female) who does not
want to express her feelings to a person of the opposite sex, because she is afraid that she will lose
her "dignity" (she is very conservative and traditional). Now, I wonder if concepts such as this could
undermine, as I have said before, the realizations of really important objectives in one's life, such as
meeting the person who one will marry.

In short, I think that honesty is more important than dignity (especially if "dignity" is causing you
distress and doubt). It may not have the results that she desires, but it will allow her to be responsible
for her actions and she won't be able to blame concepts such as: tradition, values (dignity), morals for
her failures.

"But I am easily hurt and afraid of being hurt." — To protect oneself in this way (dignity) is the death
of all love. For real love one needs courage...

Don't be too cowardly to put a person's friendship to the test. "The walking-stick that looks pretty so
long as one carries it, but bends as soon as you rest your weight upon it, is worth nothing." Ludwig
Wittgenstein.

— I hope that I have managed to present my case in a coherent manner.

============

I'll have a go at a couple of things you ask. Firstly, I would say that Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics,
Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Moralsand J. S. Mill's Utilitarianismare central to the study
of ethics. They are, to my mind, the classic texts that cover the three main ethical theories (though
there are many more, of course). If you want an introductory text, James Rachel's The Elements of
Moral Philosophy(McGraw-Hill) is excellent.

As to your question about your friend, I think that you need to make distinctions between the three
things that you seem to lump together — morals, values and traditions. I don't think they are at all the
same things, or even the same sorts of things. She values dignity, maybe because it is traditional to
do so, but I am not sure that I would call dignity here a moral value. It is a tricky question, though!

Even granting that dignity is a moral value, I don't find it surprising that one moral value should
interfere with another. Unfortunately, it seems to me that our moral values are bound to come into
conflict with one another, and with other imperatives we have — to happiness for example. Making
the best choices in the midst of this complexity is difficult, and we don't always get it right. To open
ourselves to love, as you say, is risky, and we have no guarantee of success if we do. Your friend is
responsible for her actions whether she chooses to take the risk, or to keep her dignity. It also seems
to me that we can — indeed, must — blame our values if the choice turns out badly, because our
choices spring from our values, be they moral or otherwise. That does not necessarily mean the
values in question are bad ones to have: just that giving them the major say in this case turned out
badly.

Nor is it to say that all our present values must be the ones we live by, either. If choices based on a
certain set of them turn out badly for us (judged, as they must be, by other values we hold), then we
may decide that we wish to readjust our hierarchy of values, or even change those values altogether.
So, we may find that what we valued as dignity is now seen more as an aloof reserve, or a too
extreme shyness. As Aristotle says, we must take care with our values, and hence care about the sort
of person we are.

Tim Sprod

At university, our basic reading on ethics was the utilitarian philosopher who bases morality on the
greatest good (J S Mill) the rational philosopher who bases ethics in duty (Kant), and the philosopher
who bases morality in sentiment (Hume). Sadly, we were even made to think of ethics in terms of
"rational bargaining" — Gilbert Harman, I think.

I would suggest:

J L Mackie: Ethics:Inventing Right and Wrong(as a general introduction) And more interesting books
that seem to me to be along the right lines: R Gaita: Good and Evil: An absolute Conception, P
Winch: Trying to Make SenseI Murdoch: Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals,M Buber: Knowledge of
Man.And though this includes the notion of dignity, I think it is obligatory to read this book: Kant:
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals

Dignity is a concept belonging to ethics as duty. The Kantian idea is that man is worthy of respect
insofar as he is a rational, and thereby dignified being. It is also arises in the ethics of Emmanuel
Levinas. For Levinas, man does not have dignity because he is rational but because he has the
power to command an ethical response. But this is moral dignity rather than repression posing as
dignity. Moral dignity is about recognising commands upon us from others. When a person makes
claims about their own dignity, they are talking how they want to be seen, and this the psychological
sense of the term. There is also a descriptive sense to the term. There are people we call dignified
because we respect them for their personal qualities.

I absolutely agree that honesty is a better human quality than dignity — though not everyone would.
I'd say that lack of dignity goes hand in hand with honesty and must do so because man is not really
dignified (so a small of dignity or repression is needed if the nature of one's honesty is to be
appropriate). Ethical theories can be understood as idealizations attempting to account for moral
feeling or as descriptions of how things seem to be, and in both cases the non-moral language of
psychology gets used. In the non-moral sense, dignity is a mode of behaviour much favoured by the
Victorians and now favoured by those who aim to receive respect, or it's a defence mechanism. In the
case of your friend, the claim to dignity seems to be defensive, a form of repressed closure against
others, which is sad, but perhaps you have to let such people be and respect their claims to dignity.
We can change people's natures to a certain extent, through closeness and friendship, but defences
run deep.

Ethics isn't an obstacle to personal development, though social values might be: But even then I'm
not sure to what extent social values in Victorian times would have halted personal development,
rather than limiting freedom. In the case of your friend, the obstacle to her personal development lies,
perhaps, in her history which determined the nature of her personality.

If a person is sensitive and easily hurt, she has to find a way of dealing with the possibility of hurt
which is appropriate to her nature. A person can't just harden up. And deliberately putting a person's
friendship to the test seems a bit cruel and pointless and Wittgenstein probably didn't mean that this
is something we should do, but rather that real friendship would stand up to a test. Friendship is built
on trust and trust doesn't naturally give rise to the requirement for test. But I do think a defensive
claim to dignity or any such repression makes the development of a relationship very difficult and your
friend's encounter with your own honesty may be good for her.

Rachel Browne

Well, here's a list:

Very good intro book: Sommers, C., & Sommers, F. (1985) Vice & virtue in everyday life; introductory
readings in ethicsFort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace & Company. Good: Sinnott-Armstrong, W., &
Timmons, M. (1996) Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemologyNew York: Oxford
University Press. Audi, R. (1997) Moral knowledge and ethical characterNew York, NY: Oxford
University Press. May, L., Friedman, M., & Clark, A. E. (1998) Mind and morals: essays on cognitive
science and ethicsBoston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Specific points of view: MacIntyre, A. (1984) After virtueNotre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press. MacIntyre, A. (1988) Whose justice? Which rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press. Dewey, J. (1988) Human nature and conduct, 1922Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press. Williams, B. (1985) Ethics and the limits of philosophyCambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1995) A theory of justiceCambridge: Harvard University Press. (Nussbaum has a book out
recently which is supposed to be very good; look it up also.)

General issues in meta-ethics: BonJour, L. (1985) The structure of empirical knowledgeCambridge:
Harvard University Press.

That should get you started, anyway. There are manyothers; these are just some off my shelf.

As far as "dignity" goes... I could get into a real rant here... but, you know, I sympathize with her, to
some extent. I don't think that this is, actually, so much an ethical issue (of course it is to some extent)
as it is a social one. First, how much does or should one expose themselves and risk rejection and
hurt? Second, what social consequences would there be for her, from her family, friends, etc.? Well, I
don't know, do I? Only she can evaluate that. Now, on the other hand, as far as I'm concerned, there
is no doubt that unthinking adherence to tradition ruins lives. You're asking a philosopher about
thinking about things? What other answer would I give? On the other hand, there are many people
who get a very clear sense of identity and security from their traditions, etc., and as long as they can
be reasonably flexible (which, unfortunately, they usually cannot, in my experience) about adhering to
them, why not? So again, it's a matter of balance, isn't it.

I actually don't think that you need or want a strictly philosophical answer here. It sounds like you, or
both of you, need to go talk to a counselor, an older wiser friend, or something like that.

Steven Ravett Brown