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Chris asked:

Since the existence of, or the non-existence of God can't be empirically demonstrated, then would it
follow that free will or a person's choices cannot be (assuredly) attributed to the person as a moral
agent. Is man a free moral agent?

============

This troubles me. Firstly, I am not convinced that the existence of God cannot be empirically
demonstrated — just that it hasn't been (with no implication that it ever will be). But let's just, for the
sake of argument, accept that it can't.

Even so, I fail to see why it is that this fact has anything to do with the existence or non-existence of
free will (or moral agency). The two are quite distinct questions, to me. My answer to your last
question is 'yes', but for reasons that are totally independent of the existence (or not) of God. [My
reasons are to do with the inescapable experience we have of choice.]

Tim Sprod