Nathan asked:

Who would you regard as triumphant in the war over legal principles, H.L.A. Hart or Ronald Dworkin
or neither?

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Neither can be taken as triumphant in a general way partly because each philosopher can be
understood as taking in different aspects of the concept of law. One is interpreting the nature of law
with reference to that which lies behind the law, and the other is describing the actual structure of the
law. There is a difference between them which follows from this concerning legal principles. Dworkin
sees adjudication as drawing on moral integrity whereas Hart takes it that the judge interprets the
letter of the law, that legal principles are written and we have a rule which enables us to recognise
what a legal principle is and a system within which to determine what these principles are.

On this, I'd be inclined to go with Hart. It may well be that the operation of the law is posterior to
integrity, and it may well be that the judge needs integrity, but as I see the process of case law, there
is very little reliance on integrity. Rather, it seems that the process is one of consistency, and an
attempt to abide by the letter of the law. A judge cannot simply make new law, so how far can moral
integrity be involved in actual fact? It may be a necessary quality of judges, but it doesn't follow there
is individual input to any major extent. Also, I think that law has to be divorced from morality because
it is essentially a generalisation of rules for particular situations and has a different sort of force from
the moral.

Have you read Hart's Postscriptedited by Jules Coleman comparing Dworkin and Hart?

Rachel Browne