Greg asked:

I am currently writing a paper on implications of comparing "cogito ergo sum" and "vollo ergo sum"
(i.e. I think therefore I am and I will therefore I am).

There are obvious implications for the concept of Cartesian dualism in that "will" does not allow for
separation of mind and body.

Is this right? Are there other possible implications I should take into account?

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Focusing on Descartes two comments: The statements 'I think' and 'I will' or 'I desire' both entail 'I
am'. In other words any state that I am in entails that I must exist in the first place. For Descartes
there is a difference between the two in that my intellectual grasp, my understanding of things is
limited since my knowledge is limited (since I am a finite being and not God), but my will is unlimited.
In the 'Meditations' he gives examples where the will is strongly inclined and the self assents to a
proposition e.g. the cogito, or in the absence of perceiving things clearly and distinctly i.e. in the
absence of proper understanding or knowledge there is 'indifference'. Considering his scenario of the
self as a 'thinking thing' assenting to propositions or refraining from judgement one could argue that
these are instances of 'will' in action that do not necessitate a body.

On the other hand one could argue: Show me the will to sit down without actually sitting down. Also
Descartes' concept of will has been questioned e.g. on the grounds that there seem to be cases
where we are not free to 'will' to believe something: Can a wife 'will' to believe her husband is faithful,
if there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary? Could Descartes' thinker choose not to believe the
cogito?

Helene Dumitriu

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