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Tom asked:

What right has Lacan to apply the Hegelian Master/ Slave transcendental pattern to the empirical
therapeutic situation?

============

Peter Dews in Logics of Disintegrationsays that Lacan was influenced by Alexandre Kojeve's
Introduction to Reading Hegelin which Kojeve interprets Hegel's Phenomenology of Mindas being
based on the core position that self-consciousness cannot emerge without a relation to another
desiring subject and this led Lacan to the idea that what was wrong in Freud's thinking is that he was
a victim of psycho-physical parallelism and that his theory of mind characterised man as a solipsistic
being who could become self-consciousness alone. Given this, I suppose that in the therapeutic
situation the part played by the therapist, who is another determining subject of the patient's
consciousness, becomes emphasised. Consciousness is recognised as precarious, there is more to
reality than speech, and within this reality there are relationships of dominance, and alienated desire.
This is not a matter of "right", but of speculative theory being influential in the empirical situation,
which is how psychoanalysis works.

Dews also finds that Lacan was influenced by Hegel's relation between consciousness and history
and social conditions and Hegel's view that beliefs do not reveal truths about ourselves. If Hegel is
correct, and Lacan is purported to have believed him to be so, then there is justification in bringing
philosophy into empirical situations. However, I notice in The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psycho-analysis
at the end of the paper on alienation, that Lacan appears to deny this influence of
Hegel. It is not the thesis that the subject is constituted by that which is external to him whereby
Lacan was influenced by Hegel, but in the alienated consciousness of the self, the duality of
consciousness and unconsciousness in which Lacan claims Hegel influenced him.

And the nature of an emerged self-consciousness, with the alienation of the self behind a veil,
probably doesn't have so much part to play in the empirical therapeutic situation.

Rachel Browne

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