Brandon asked:

I recently created an argument that I think might be an ontological disproof of god's existence, but
every person I have presented it to has changed the subject, or said that they would think about it and
get back to me and never did, and I would really like some critiques of it, especially if any of the
premises have been proven to be false. here it is in a series of categoricals (except the second
conclusion):

"
1. Everything that thinks, changes

2. Everything that changes, is destroyed

3. Nothing that is destroyed is eternal

4. Therefore, nothing that thinks is eternal

5. Therefore, the mind of god is (not thinking or not eternal)"

This would have applications to all eternal entities if true of course, but I thought about it in relation to
god first and so that is how I have been presenting it. Of course it could most easily be solved by
appealing to god's immanence, but then how would god decide to make a changing universe to
become immanent in? Mainly it would apply to judeo-christian theology anyway.

Thank you for any and all help you can provide me with.

============

Brandon — I think there are two basic flaws to your argument. 1. The first is that you call this a
disproof of God's existence, but that is not in fact what your conclusion relates to. A more precise
formulation of the issue you address might be this: "Is it consistent to believe in a god who is both
rational and eternal?" If your argument holds water, this would naturally be a problem for orthodox
Christianity, but it would not be a disproof of God per se. Although "God" in the Jewish-Christian
tradition is a rational and eternal being, it is quite possible to conceive of a non-rational god, and even
a non-eternal one. In fact many people do believe in "gods" who are not "rational" in our sense of the
word.

2. The second flaw concerns your second statement, "Everything that changes, is destroyed". Here
you are attempting to make an absolute statement based on empirical evidence — but this cannot be
done. It may be true, in our experience, that everything that changes is destroyed, but our experience
is limited. Empirical science deals not in absolute truths, but in hypotheses and probabilities. The very
best it can achieve on any subject whatever is a statement to the effect that "judging by the currently
available evidence in the currently observable universe, this would appear to be the case". Many of
these hypotheses are obviously close enough to the truth for us to live by them: Turning on a light or
starting a car assumes faith in a hypothesis about the behaviour of electricity which on the whole
turns out to work. But there may be evidence which we have not yet uncovered, there may be parts of
the universe that we have not yet observed, and there may be combinations of circumstances, even
in the world we know, which have not yet arisen. There may also be aspects of reality which are
impossible to observe directly. Emotional pain, say in a divorce, is not measurable or even
observable, except by introspection. All we can observe is the behaviour of those affected. Does the
pain not exist? Empirical data is therefore by nature incomplete, and this means that it is not possible
either to prove or disprove your second statement. Our experience of the universe may have led us to
a correct hypothesis, but there is no way of testing this in absolute terms. Since your whole argument
rests on the truth of this statement, this means that the argument as it stands can be neither proven
nor disproven.

Immanuel Kant came to the same conclusion: The existence and nature of god can neither be proved
nor disproved. If God (in the Jewish-Christian conception) exists he is by definition not bound the
"laws" of the physical universe, and that means that we cannot prove or disprove his existence by
studying the universe. It is therefore a matter of a priori choice, not a matter or reason, whether you
believe in such a God or not.

But you are welcome to disagree if you think my argument is flawed!

Paul M Waters

http://www.paul-waters.co.uk

Most of Brandon's argument goes through:

"1. All T's are C's

2. All C's are D's

3. All D's are not-E's

4. Therefore, all T's are not-E's."

But he further concludes:

"5. Therefore, God is either not-T or not-E."

Unfortunately, 'God' does not appear in any of the premises. From them one can conclude to a denial
of God's existence only if one assumes that God is bothT andE. But why should one assume that?
(Aristotle's divine First Mover is eternal and thinks, but doesn't change and can't be destroyed.
[Metaphysics,Book Lambda, 1072-1073.] Was Aristotle confused?) Also, Brandon leaves the reader
uncertain as to the meaning of to change (substantially or accidentally?) and destroyed (annihilated
or merely decomposed?). So the truth of the premises is uncertain. His argument has the virtue of
brevity, but brevity at the cost of clarity is no bargain.

The generic concept of God relevant to philosophical theology (pro and con) was best captured by
David Ray Griffin: a personal, purposive being who is supreme in power and perfect in goodness,
who created the world and acts providentially in it, who is experienced by human beings and is the
ultimate guarantee for the meaningfulness of human life, the ultimate ground of hope for the victory of
good over evil, thereby alone worthy of worship. (Religion and Scientific Naturalism, page 90) The
relevance of Brandon's syllogism to that concept, and more importantly to the effort of human minds
to wrap themselves around the issue of God, is not clear.

Tony Flood

What do you think "god" refers to in these propositions? How can god be a term of a proposition in
the first place if the conclusion is that He is unthinkable? If god is "thinkable" what is being thought? If
god is "unthinkable" what is not being thought? — god? But in that case you're stating a tautology. In
the first place, why not ask yourself if what is being thought is what is customarily meant by "god",
and if not, why not? And is it the "god" of the philosophers, i.e an abstraction, like x, that is thinkable?
Why cannot this abstraction be G-d — that is, "the God of our fathers, of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob"?
What is the difference between god and God and what difference to your propositions does this
difference make? Is philosophy about smart games with words, ideograms, or is it a love of wisdom in
which a real philosopher — rather than sophistical playing with words — is ever searching out the
face of that which he loves, and in which 'knowledge' is relational heartfelt and irreducible to straight
information and class — book answers?

Matthew Del Nevo

www.sicetnon.com

I'll have a go at this. I find (1) unobjectionable. I'm not so sure about (2). What about the universe as a
whole? Of course, it may be destroyed in the Big Crunch, but I don't think that it must be. (3) is almost
tautological. If (2) is not (always) true, then your argument fails.

In any case, I'm not sure that matters for your argument, because I understand that 'eternal', in
theological terms, is usually taken to imply being outside of time and hence unchanging. My
understanding is that an eternal god is (as your argument shows) necessarily unthinking, unable to
intervene in time — as you say, an immanent god. Thus, god cannot be the sort of god that decides
to make a changing universe. Rather, he is the Uncaused Cause, or the Unmoved Prime Mover of
the universe. Of course, this does not fit with most people's idea of what god is like, but there are
many judeo-christian accounts of god's nature, many of them incompatible.

Tim Sprod

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