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Buckley asked:
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What price truth?
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First, it seems to me, we need to unpack your question further, so this is my interpretation. Asking
'what price truth?' seems to imply that truth is not priceless. That, in turn, seems to mean that truth is
not an absolute value that 'trumps' all other values.
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If truth is not an overriding value, then I can see two possibilities. Either there is a fixed hierarchy of
values in which truth is not the top one, or there are a number of competing values which have no
fixed order of preference. In the second case, we need to know exactly what the circumstances are
when we make a judgement about whether truth, or some other value, should take precedence.
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I think that the second answer is the right one. Let's look at an example. In arguing that the duty not to
tell lies overrides all other values, Kant gave a famous one: A friend of yours asks you to hide him
from a mad axe murderer, so you do. The axe murderer then appears and asks you where your friend
is. Is truth priceless — must you tell him? Kant says yes. I would say no. Though truth is important, so
is caring for others.
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So... what price truth? Quite a high price, but exactly how much depends on then other competing
values at play, and the exact context.
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Tim Sprod
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