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Mark asked:
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This is about Thomas Nagel's essay "Moral Luck" (in his book Mortal Questions).
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I am trying to find what are Nagel's reservations on Kant's statement that "the only thing that can
called good without qualification is the good will."
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Nagel objects to Kant's claim that the only thing of value is a good will. He objects on the basis that
however good one's will may be, it is always subject to luck or circumstances. While you may have a
good will with regard to a situation, it may be that circumstances make it the case that your action is
not judged by others as morally "good". If you accidentally kill someone, the fact that you had a good
will isn't going to absolve you from moral blame or the judgement that your action was bad. In raising
the objection of "moral luck" Nagel's claim is that we judge people on what they do and if, as bad luck
or circumstance would have it, you do wrong through no fault of your own, and with no bad intentions,
the condition of your will doesn't the moral value of your action.
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I don't think is a strong objection. Kant was talking about intrinsic value and Nagel is talking about
moral judgements. What is of value in itself, regardless of what happens in the world, of luck or
circumstances or whether there is blame for external action, is for Kant a good intention.
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It is, for Nagel, a matter of luck what kind of person you are. If you happen to be especially
sympathetic and kind natured, it is expected that you will be judged as more moral than a cold
person, but even the latter can do his Kantian duty. I imagine that Kant would answer the former by
saying this is not a matter of ethics but psychological relations. In the ethical moment it is necessary
that the will act purely for the other. In the latter case, the cold person may well perform his duty, and
here Nagel raises one of the main objections to Kantian ethics. But I wonder how the person Nagel
describes as "greedy, envious, cowardly, cold, ungenerous etc" could really even momentarily
possess what we understand to be the "good will". My own understanding of the good will is that it is
a real but pure state, unadulterated by sentiment, but not emptily performing in accordance with duty.
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Rachel Browne
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