Stephen asked:

Although the principle of Ockham's razor (that the simpler answer is often better than a complicated
one, provided it is not oversimplified) has been highly influential in the field of science, why has this
approach not been so highly regarded in philosophy itself?

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It is quite highly regarded. You can find references to it in every field of philosophy. However, it is,
basically, just another assertion which must be backed up with argument in any particular case. To
put it another way, although the sciences may employ it, they do not do so, as a rule, explicitly. That
is, a physicist, faced with two explanations, will not choose the "simplest" one (assuming the physicist
even has some clear criteria for making that judgment) merely for that reason. It must have data, etc.,
backing it up; and being supported more clearly by the data weighs much more heavily than
simplicity. Now, once you've got two or more rivals for an explanation, all of which seem to do an
equally good job, then you can fall back on Occam's Razor to make a tentative choice between them.
But all the romanticism of "beauty", "simplicity", and so forth that everyone holds forth on so
eloquently is very post hoc... if you look at the literature, you'll find that cutting-edge work in virtually
any field is messy, difficult, and complex... and data-driven.

Steven Ravett Brown

The question is not what philosophers think of the use of Occam's razor in the empirical sciences, but
rather its application to philosophical theories. Here is an extreme view:

"If a sign is useless,it is meaningless. That is the point of Occam's maxim (L. Wittgenstein Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus3.327).

Occam's maxim is, of course, not an arbitrary rule, nor one that is justified by its success in practice:
its point is that unnecessaryunits in a sign-language mean nothing (ibid. 5.47321)."

Taking Wittgenstein at his word, it is inconceivable that there could be two alternative philosophical
theories, one of which was preferred to the other on the grounds of positing the fewest entities, or
making the fewest assumptions. If we are faced with such a decision, all that can mean is that we
haven't thought things through thoroughly enough. If we did, we would realize that one of the two
alternatives must be meaningless.

My view? I think I can see why Wittgenstein says this. But I can't agree with it. There are many
occasions when a philosophers sense of judgementis called for. Perhaps because 'thinking things
through' to the bitter end is an impossible ideal. In practice, the philosopher makes the decision to go
with one theory rather than an alternative theory on similar grounds to those which the scientist
appeals to.

I am notsaying (as some philosophers would like to say) that this shows that philosophy is just
another species of theory making, alongside chemistry, physics etc.

Geoffrey Klempner