Andy asked:

I am trying to get clear about Davidson's scheme/ content distinction as a generalisation of the
analytic/ synthetic distinction. Is this anything like it?

The model:

The world (from Wittgenstein's Tractatus) consists of simple objects, these can be linked to form
'states of affairs', the obtaining of a state of affairs is a fact.

Mind: A representation of a state of affairs is a picture — a proposition is such a 'logical' picture. In
the picture names go proxy for objects. Any proposition therefore must be analysable into names
each of which stands for a simple object. Simple objects must exist to stop an infinite regress.

Analytic/ synthetic distinction. An analytic sentence is true by meaning, a synthetic one is true by
data, to say a proposition is tautological is to say it is analytic, which is to say it contains two parts
that 'mean the same thing', again which is to say it can be analysable into parts that represent the
same simple objects? (this is the part I am particularly perplexed about, what do 'meanings' do? —
connect the representations in virtue of projecting out into the world? how else could two
representations mean the same thing?

Scheme/ content distinction. In 'immediate awareness' there exists 'the given' — names? These are
synthesised into propositions, this synthesis is done according to a 'scheme', the appropriate rules for
combining them (in analytic philosophy — the rules of logic implicit in language). The rules are 'in the
mind', they are what the mind contributes, this is why analytic truths are indubitable.

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First I'll forget your interpretation, because trying to understand it could influence mine. In "On the
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" Davidson treats the idea that there could be differing conceptual
schemes (i.e. in fact different 'truths', sometimes called conceptual relativism). By different conceptual
schemes Davidson means basicallydifferent points of view on the same thing. He concludes that two
people have different conceptual schemes if they speak languages that cannot be translated in one
another. But because he considers translatability as a criterion of any language, he speaks about
partialfailure of translation.

First question: how could different conceptual schemes be possible, i.e. different truths exist? Two
elements must be present:

1. The relation seen between objects is essentially different in the two 'compared' languages (if
experiences of the speakers of those languages don't share the same logic or rationality).

2. Failure of translation (in fact result of 1)

This is a notion from mathematical logic. In Formal Languages such different schemes are treated. In
my opinion general philosophy could speed up quite a bit by looking more at mathematical logic.

Davidson says: "Something is a language, and associated with a conceptual scheme, whether we
can translate it or not, if it stands in a certain relation (predicting, organizing, facing, or fitting) to
experience. Thus, the CHALLENGE is to say what the relation is and be clearer about the entities
related."

The difference of two logic schemes that are essentially different is found in two ways of explaining.
There is no real comparing, only trying to find out the different explanations for the same object or
action. Something is said to be an acceptableconceptual scheme or theory if it fits sensory evidence.
Thus in the case of failure of translatability there clearly are different sensory experiences, maybe
incomparable senses. Here we have two different truths.

Just for the sake of being able of considering translatability as part of any language Davidson speaks
about partial failure of translation. In fact two different truths means total failure of translation.
Languages can only be translated into one another IF they share the same truth (or conceptual
scheme). That is my own interpretation, but this statement seems difficult to really contradict.

Translating includes that there is a third language, being (at least) the sum of the two translated ones.
Often not all statements can be translated from one language into another (their truths partly differ).
That's why partial translatability comes in handy, but the essence behind it remains that the failure is
caused by different truths. That means that translatability is NOT a trait of every pair of 2 languages
(i.e. if you want to call any form of verbal communication language). Space travel could make us meet
beings that we don't understand.

You have to distinguish interpretation and translation. Between two languages always interpretation is
possible by means of a third language that contains both. To keep it simple: in language 1 a
statement is "dogs bite cats" and possibly in 2 "sometimes 4 legged animals don't understand each
other". Clearly in language 1 in this statement dog are unequal to cats or A=/=B, and A and B relate
by biting. In language 2 in this statement A and B equal and relate by misunderstanding. So it's better
too speak about interpretation instead of translation. For such an interpretation a third language is
used. It contains both language 1 and 2. Between 1 and 2 there is total failure of translation. But
language 3 offers space for interpretation.

In quantum-theory you have particles described by for instance 75% of time equal to A and 25%
equal to B. What if in a third language B is understood in a third language C, but not A? This situation
resembles schizophrenia were someone part of the time is in an unknown world. Then there is no
translation or interpretation

Back to your questions:

So both languages can consist of analytic sentences (based on a kind of basic logic). Both too can
have synthetic ones (Based on experience. In an acceptable scheme this fits basic logic too.)

In any language many sentences are similar (or tautological if they can be reduced to the same basic
sentence).

Scheme / content distinction. The scheme consists of a couple of basic propositions. The content of
any sentence in theory is reducible to such basic propositions, but because of tautologies they can
become very complex.

The mind only USES schemes, so it only plays an active role as interpreter.

Henk Tuten