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Amy asked:

I am having a problem defining realism. I hope you can clear this up for me.

============

The meaning of the terms Realism and Anti-Realism has been much discussed in modern
philosophy. As I understand the terms the following map might help

(D is the discourse in question — i.e. the comic, the good, the scientific etc)

(1) are any of the sentences of D truth-apt? (capable of being true or false)

If yes then go to (2), If no then you are a anti-realist non-cognitivistabout D. You believe the the
surface grammar of D is not actually expressive of facts but something else, i.e. emotions as many
non-cognitivists about the moral hold.

(2) Are any of the sentences of D true?

If Yes, then you are a Realist about the discourse. You believe that the D is a factual discourse and
some of the sentences are true. Go to (4).

If no, then you are an anti-realist error-theoristabout the D. You believe that though the sentences of
D are truth-apt, none of the sentences aretrue. J.L. Mackie was an error-theorist about the moral
(Ethics Inventing Right and Wrong). He believed that moral sentences are capable of truth, but the
world 'lets us down' and there are no moral properties. Thus, when we make moral judgements, we
commit an error (hence Error-theory!)

(3) Does D exhibit a cognitive command?

If yes, then no two people, with all the information about D, can disagree about the truth-value of one
of D's sentences without committing a rational error. i.e. one of their cognitive capacities is functioning
wrongly. If two people, with all the information canstill disagree, then this is good (though not
conclusive) reason to be an anti-realist about the discourse.

Supplementary Realist question:

(3a) Are the truths about D mind-dependent or mind-independent?

If mind-dependent then the truths are dependent on minds existing i.e. if no minds then no truths. If
mind-independent then even if no minds then still truths. I.e: if no one existed 2+2 still equals 4 but
Monty Python would not be funny. Though you can be a realist about the funny and about logic, you
can have different kinds of realism, as your answers to 3a might be different.

I hope this helps a bit, there is a lot of literature on the realism debate. This is just how I was taught it
in Uni, and how I approach the question.

Rich Woodward