Eve asked:

Why did Zeno's paradoxes provoke such a deep crisis in the intellectual environment of ancient
Greece? Show how philosophical progress after Zeno required some compromise between the views
of the Parmenidean camp and those of the pre-Parmenidean camp.

and Zero asked:

Could you explain Parmenides' and Zeno's objections to the reality of change?

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I'll give you two of a number of equally valid reasons:

(1) If you hold to the ontological view that "Whatever is, is" (as Parmenides did), then logically this
implies, "Whatever is, cannot not be." Therefore creation and destruction, both of which are neither
being nor non-being, are logically impossible: e.g. to become,the thing that is becoming must be
something already, it cannot be nothing. But this means it is. Conversely, if something is to be
destroyed totally,you need to ask where the matter goes that is being annihilated. But wherever it
goes, it cannot not be. Therefore in ultimate reality nothing ever changes, the universe is one
unchanging material block. From this Parmenides deduced that all change whatever is illogical, yet
since we seem to experience change nonstop, it was necessary to discredit the senses which
communicate change to us. Parmenides himself did this in his poem by depicting the realm of
ultimate truth as the immortal Gods' realm. The gods, who are not prone to illusion as we are,
demonstrate the changelessness of reality to him.

From a modern scientific perspective you would probably say that it is contradictory (for the gods) to
be eternally changing along with evolution, where and how would they end up? But just in case you
think this is all hocus pocus, since it is so obvious that the world is in a state of non-stop
transformation, the fact is that even today's scientists have not given up on Parmenides' notion. For a
fascinating insight into his enduring impact on physics, you might delve into Popper's The World of
Parmenides.

(2) Zeno's paradoxes, or logoias he called them, are demonstrations of the impossibility of motion, by
showing that all increments of seeming motion can be broken down into discrete units, i.e. an arrow in
flight, so comprehended, is really standing still. Proof that change is mere illusion communicated by
the senses. Zeno's puzzles, I might add, were not solved until the 17th century. At least to scientists'
satisfaction. Some philosophers maintain, however, they were never solved and indeed can never be
solved, because their logic is unassailable.

Jurgen Lawrenz

Sydney