Garry asked:

Is there a general consensus amongst philosophers on whether Quine was right to deny that there
are analytic truths? If we agree with him is it still possible to do conceptual analysis, i.e. finding the
necessary and sufficient conditions that a concept must satisfy? A lot of philosophers still seem to be
doing philosophy like this. Can you recommend reading material please — I have got Quine's essays
and the reply by Strawson and Grice. I would also like to know how this fits with Putnam and Kripke's
views and would be grateful for some guidance on this (to me) perplexing and difficult subject.

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Concerning Quine and the status of analytic "truths"... I certainly do not think that Quine has the last
word on the matter or that there is much general consensus... (But I'm not au faitwith Putnam or
Kripke's current thinking.)

However for what I think is a most useful take on the issue that cuts across the whole debate (and to
my mind settles it — or at least points in a direction which I reckon would settle it), I most strongly
urge you to take a look at Chapter 7 of Wittgenstein's Place in 20th Century Analytic Philosophyby
P.M.S Hacker — in particular pages 212 to 216. ANY serious discussion of the issue will, I believe, at
least have to take some account of the considerations put forward here.

Robert de Villiers