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Sherman asked:

In what way can Kant and Mill's theories contribute to the Moral business environment?

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The moral theories of Kant and Mill agree in defining the moral point of view as the viewpoint of
disinterested impartiality. To respect every person as an 'end in themself', according to Kant's
formula, entails seeing their needs and interests as absolutely on a par with the needs and interests
of every other human being.

Yet the moral philosophies of Kant and Mill are in other respects diametrically opposed. For Mill, to
act morally is to weigh up the consequences of one's action for human happiness or misery - hence
the formula, 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number. For Kant, an action is moral only if it is
motivated by a universal principle which holds for all rational beings, irrespective of the
consequences.

How do Kant's and Mill's theories contribute to the moral business environment? There is a problem
to resolve concerning what business is for. Marx caricatured business activity as the pursuit of narrow
self-interest. Morality existed in a capitalist society, according to Marx, ostensibly to ensure rules of
'fair play', but in reality to ensure the dominance of one class by another.

What Marx seems to have missed was that fair competition is the spur for human progress. It is not
true that 'all is fair in love, war and business'. We have to keep our promises. We have to consider the
consequences of our actions for the well being of others. Yet we also accept the principle that 'the
best man wins'.

In defining the moral business environment, Kant and Mill both have a part to play. It is important that
certain actions should be regarded as absolutely unacceptable. It is also important that we should be
prepared to widen our vision to look at the whole picture, and not just at the immediate effects of our
actions.

My own view, however, is that both philosophers have missed something vital from the equation.
Friendship, loyalty are virtues that do not fit well with the determination to be impartial at all costs.
That is why my own emphasis would be on an 'ethics of dialogue', where rights and wrongs are
decided, not absolutely for all time, but through negotation between interested parties.

Geoffrey Klempner