Cindy asked:

What are the premises and conclusions for J.L. Mackie's subjectivity of values in Ethics: Inventing
Right and Wrong?

Can you give an analysis of his arguments?

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Mackie gives a number of arguments against moral realism in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.The
one im going to talk about is the 'queerness' argument. The basic idea is that Mackie wants to show
that moral properties are somehow metaphysically queer, in that they are quite unlike any other kind
of properties that exist and hence there existence should be rejected. The argument goes as follows:

*If moral properties are real then they have to be objective

*If moral properties are real then they have to be subjective

*If moral properties are real then they have to be both subjective and objective

*It's not the case that any property is both objective and subjective

*Therefore, it's not the case that moral properties are real

Mackie gives support to (1) because Mackie thinks that moral properties would have to be primary
properties in a Lockean sense (i.e the same kind as shape) in order to make them really objective. (2)
is supported because Mackie thinks that moral properties would also have to be like secondary
qualities (like colour and taste) in order to be so closely tied to subjective states in an individual. Such
a property (both a primary and a secondary) would, according to Mackie, be hopelessly queer.

People have responded to Mackie in a number of ways but ill mention just one. John McDowell (in his
"Values and Secondary Qualities") has responded by saying that what's really wrong with Mackie's
argument is his conception of the primary/ secondary property divide. McDowell argues that if we
think about moral properties on a secondary quality model then we can generate enough objectivity
for us all to be happy with. The basic divide is that Mackie takes it that secondary properties can't be
objective, whereas McDowell thinks they can. McDowell thinks that secondary properties can be
viewed dispositionally (i.e. x is red if and only if a standard observer in standard conditions would
judge x is red) and that this can generate a level of objectivity that is sufficient for a genuine moral
realism. Whether McDowell is correct is another matter (for the record, I don't think so) and im
deliberately cutting this short because I could talk about this for a long time. Feel free to email me
with any follow ups....

Rich Woodward