Philo
Sophos
·com

philosophy is for everyone
and not just philosophers

philosophers should know lots
of things besides philosophy


PhiloSophos knowledge base

Philosophical Connections

Pathways to Philosophy programs

Pathways web sites

Philosophy lovers gallery

Science, arts and humanities

PhiloSophos home

home first back 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 forward

Jack asked:

I am not exactly sure how to state this so I will try to cite an example first.

When shooting pool sometime I miss an easy shoot and it totally baffles me. Afterwards, thinking
about the whole game I will determine that it was not the correct shot to "win" the game. I believe that
my subconscious was fighting so much to get through to my brain that it distracted me so much that I
missed the easy shoot.

I think this happens in real life as to cause some major mistakes, due to this inner turmoil. You might
think you really had some insight and go ahead and do what you where going to do. When in reality
what you did was completely wrong and you never realized it, of course, till it was after the fact.

Are there any psychology studies on this philosophy and/ or what it might be called so I could do
some research on it?

============

There are so many reasons we make mistakes that I can't possibly even begin to go into them. One
mistake youare making is trying to account for mistakes through one overriding class of causes. But
mistakes are caused by many classes of causes. For example, your pool shot. Here's one possibility:
suppose that as you're lining up to make this shot, you start thinking about how you might missthe
shot. Well, in order to do that, you have, to some extent to rehearse missingthe shot. In other words,
thinking about a movement activates the motor areas, to some extent, responsible for that movement.
So to make a shot, to walk steadily, to ride a bike, to ski, to play ping-pong, you need to think about
makingthe shot, etc., and notabout how you might miss it. Then you will be rehearsing the correct
motion, by thinking about it. This accounts for some degree of some people's clumsiness and
accident-proneness, I believe. My theory is that they are literally constantly practicing how to drop
things, how to stumble, etc., by thinkingabout doing those things. And since they practice so much,
they get good at doing them. Mind you, this is my personal theory; I have no idea as to whether it is
actually true... but the neurological basis for it is there.

Another way we make mistakes is, as you speculate, by interference with other tasks or other
sensory images: "distractions". Also, if we try to do several things at once, because we have limited
capacities, we cannot devote as much to any one, and will tend to lose concentration and make
mistakes.

Another way we make mistakes is by coming to the wrong conclusion about something and following
through on that conclusion. But there's no reason that this has to be due to "inner turmoil"; you might
be perfectly calm and still conclude that, say, Echinacea is an effective cold remedy, or that crystals
give one psychic powers, or that decks of cards or tea leaves will reveal the future. There are people
who believe these things, and many more, despite overwhelming evidence against them.

There are many other causes of mistakes. Perceptual illusions, conceptual limitations... by the way,
this is not a philosophy. These things come under both psychology and philosophy, and there are so
many categories here that I don't even know where to refer you.

Here are some readings:

Piattelli-Palmarini, M. "Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule Our Minds." New York, NY:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994.

Rozenblit, L., and F. Keil. "The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An Illusion of Explanatory
Depth." Cognitive Science26 (2002): 521-562.

Piaget, J. Insights and Illusions of Philosophy.Translated by W. Mays. New York, NY: The World
Publishing Co., 1971.

Damasio, A.R. Descartes' Error; Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.New York, NY: Avon
Books, 1994.

Schwartz, B.L., D.M. Travis, A.M. Castro, and S. M. Smith. "The Phenomenology of Real and Illusory
Tip-or-the-Tongue States." Memory & Cognition 28, no. 1 (2000): 18-27.

Boyer, P. "Natural Epistemology or Evolved Metaphysics? Developmental Evidence for
Early-Developed, Intuitive, Category-Specific, Incomplete, and Stubborn Metaphysical Presumptions."
Philosophical Psychology13, no. 3 (2000): 277-297.

Hines, T. Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence.Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus Books, 1988.

Schick, T., Jr., and L. Vaughn. How to Think About Weird Things: Critical Thinking for a New Age.
Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1995.

Shermer, M. Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions
of Our Time.
New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1997.

Steven Ravett Brown