Joshua asked:

In tackling my Phil107 class I came upon an essay on the mind body problem, more specifically, the
beetle in the box. How is the beetle in the box problem of mental expressions related to the cartesian
dualist view? How can the cartesian dualist respond. I'm not asking you to write my essay, merely a
pointer in the right direction would be helpful.

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The beetle in the box argument is just one of several arguments that comprise what has become
known as the Private Language Argument(s). Very roughly put the Cartesian view would appear to
assume that it is possible to doubt and discount all knowledge of "the external world", "other minds",
etc... yet at the same time retain the ability to talk sensibly about the self (the famous Cartesian
Cogito) and its "mental" states & experiences — pain, happiness, intentions, beliefs, etc, and
sensations (of colour, hot/cold, sounds, smells, etc...) because they are conceived to be somehow
mental and therefore "directly accessible" to the conscious soul and indubitable. The Cartesian then
sees his task as "rationally reconstructing" and providing secure "foundations" for all knowledge from
this basis of the Cogito and its world of mental experiences alone. So the Cartesian, having
discounted all "externals", assumes he can still meaningfully talk about his experiences of seeing red,
feeling hot, being in pain, being happy, thinking something, etc., BECAUSE he believes (or just
assumes) that he can explain the meaning of these words by reference (a sort of pointing inwardly) to
his own private mental samples of red, pain, happiness, thoughts, etc.. which he assumes are
immediately present, simply "given", within his conscious mind or soul.

Now the private language arguments as a wholeundermine this conception and its underlying
assumption of a dualism between two distinct realms — an "inner", mental world of the soul (or mind)
and an "external" world of tables and chairs and other people. They do this by arguing that the inner
world of the cogito and its alleged "mental objects" provide no basis whatsoever for the concepts of
experience, sensations, mental states, etc. that the Cartesian assumes he has a right to use. The
beetle in the box argument is just one of these and has the a very specific objective of pointing out
that:

IF (1) language is to be used as a means of public communication
AND (2) key terms (e.g. "beetle") are assumed to get their meaning only by way of reference to a
logically private mental sample, that only I can "see", locked within my "box" — the Cartesian inner
world of the mind and its "representations", THEN (3) the private mental sample (the beetle or thing in
my box) ends up being irrelevant to whatever publicmeaning our use of the concept ("beetle" or
whatever) might or might not have.

One possible response for the Cartesian is to say: — OK then, I forgo the publiccommunication
aspect and just regard my use of these words as part of a privatelanguage all of my own. I will accept
some form of scepticism as regards the possibility of communication with other people, either simply
accept it and live with it (possibly even terminating in a form of solipsism), or reckon on resolving or
explaining it away by some other means, later. But I can still lay claim to my own private language
about "beetles", "red", "pain", "happiness", etc... ...

It is the purpose of the otherbits of the private language arguments to disabuse the Cartesian, and
his later heirs, of the belief that this is an option. ... and, of course, I am assuming that you have read
the relevant sections of the Philosophical Investigations, namely paras 243-314.

Another possible response of the defender of the Cartesian conception is to try to argue that the
beetle in the box and other "private language" arguments are either (1) viciously circular ... relying on
hidden premises that are equivalent to what the arguments allegedly purport to "prove" or (2) rely on
other hidden premises or presuppositions that are, for some reason, unacceptable... you might want
to try to think what these might be yourself but we can leave them for another time,... get a hold of the
basic arguments first.

Rob de Villiers