Jean-Paul asked:

What are the later Wittgenstein's views on the correspondence between social structures and mental
structures? Does he argue against any such idea, or does his idea of a background posit precisely
this? I'm confused as I read him as rejecting any view of meaning (or mental structures) based on an
independent reality, but then I wonder how he explains the fact that our language is very much
structured by social reality (i.e. by how society has developed and divided up the world). I know this is
a wide and controversial issue, but comments would be much appreciated.

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You're correct in your reading of Wittgenstein; there is only a simple misunderstanding due to
terminology. By "independent reality" Wittgenstein (or his interpreters — I'm not sure if he ever uses
these words himself) refers to something that he intends to opposeto social reality. When he denies
that meaning is dependent on an "independent reality", he means something like the familiar
Cartesian picture of the mind: mental acts going on in our heads independently of what goes on in
other people's heads and inaccessible to them. Social reality, which according to Wittgenstein is what
meanings depend on, is the opposite of independent in this sense: it is shared by a whole community
of human beings (a "form of life", as Wittgenstein also calls it).

T. P. Uschanov

Research Assistant

Department of Philosophy

University of Helsinki