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Megan asked:
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Can you please tell me what this means or translates to? I am very confused!
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"Then it isn't because it is something seen that it is seen, but the opposite: because it is seen, it is
something seen. Nor is it because it is something led is it led; rather, because it is led, it is something
led. Nor because it is something carried is it carried; rather, because it is carried, it is something
carried. Isn't it quite clear, Euthyphro, what I wish to say? I wish to say that if something comes to be
something or is affected, it isn't because it is something coming to be that it comes to be, but because
it comes to be, is it something coming to be; because it is affected, it is something affected.
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From Plato's Euthyphro 53C "
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============
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I'll say a bit on this. Plato is talking about the difference between, let us say, external and internal, or
extrinsic and intrinsic, causes or changes. Or, to put it another way, between contingent and essential
properties. We could take a triangle, for example. Triangles must have three sides, and the only
things with three sides are triangles. So in that case, we can say: because it is something with three
sides, it is a triangle. We can also say: because it is a triangle, it has three sides.
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But carrying a book, say, is not something intrinsic to its being a book; you're doing something to that
book. The book doesn't cause itself to be carried, or need to be carried, to be a book. So because it is
carried, we can call it: something carried. But you can't say that a book is something that must be
carried to be a book; you can't say, "a book is something carried", the way you can say "a triangle is
something with three sides". Maybe you could say, "a book is something with pages", and if that is
really the essence of being a book and only of being a book (let's say it is, just for the sake of
argument), then you can say, "because it is something with pages, it is a book". So Plato is starting
with "things" and talking about causes and essences affecting and comprising things. As long as that
cause is not an essential property of that thing, it modifies the thing without modifying its essence, just
like carrying a book "modifies" it (now it's being carried) without changing its essence as a book.
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Steven Ravett Brown
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In the context of the dialogue, the character Socrates is saying that an action is judged pious because
it is pious. Not the other way round. So 'piety' cannot be defined as 'What x judges to be pious', even
if x=God.
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Geoffrey Klempner
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