Malcolm asked:

Can someone explain to me the necessary and sufficient cause distinction?

Malcolm also asked:

I don't know if this is a genuine question, but I am interested to know the ontological status of mind. It
can't seem to me to be the same as physical matter (more similar to numbers perhaps). I know
Descartes calls it a distinct substance, and I think Sartre argues it is not a substance.

Incidentally I am also interested to know what in Sartre is the ontology of art, and why does Roquetin
in Nauseathink it can cure him of the sin of existing?

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Put very simply: a necessary and sufficient cause is one where the effect could not arise without that
cause and where that cause itself is all that's needed to produce the effect. For example, a necessary
and sufficient cause for you to exist is to have a male and female parent. At present some arguments
are being bandied about in relation to cloning whether this is true or not, but I would be content to wait
upon proof to the contrary being delivered (and I'm not content that cloning proves anything at all).

>From this at any rate you can deduce that there are innumerable causes without a one-to-one
relation to effects, because additional causes are requiredthe wheels turning in a motor car are
produced by the cause 'combustion of gasoline', but this is neither necessary, because wheels may
be turned by other causes (you can push the car), nor sufficient, because the gas released in the
combustion must first push a piston, which in turn must push a lever, which in turn etc etc. So a
necessary and sufficient cause could be described using other words (synonyms) such as
'compulsory and comprehensive' or 'essential and consummate' with roughly the same meaning. The
virtue of using the standard phrasing has to do with adequacy of verbal expression: and we use this
nomenclature by Leibnitz because it is the most precise way of enunciating the principle (Leibnitz had
an inimitable gift for preciseness in such matters; indeed Ortega pointed out that nine of the ten
principal concepts of philosophy were articulated by Leibnitz in the form in which we use them today).

On the ontological status of the mind I would have to say, it has none. Irrespective of what may have
been Descartes' or Sartre's opinion on the matter, we are not in a position, either philosophically or
scientifically, to claim such a status for the mind, for the simple reason that anyone with a converse
opinion would have no difficulty punching holes into any argument we can propose for it. Now I put it
this way for reasons of objectivity and in contradiction to my own beliefs: for I am myself satisfied that
mind is ontologically distinct. But I cannot overlook on that account that an ontology of mind is a
matter of persuasion, not proof. That 'mind' exists we can assert without fear of denial, but what it isis
an indispensable part of any ontological argument, and on this we haven't got much of a clue. For
Descartes as much as for Sartre, the ontology of mind is a metaphysical concept, and accordingly
whatever satisfaction we may gain from the study of their writings (e.g. the cogito statement or the
'in-itself' and 'for-itself' principle of Sartre), a residue of ontological uncertainty remains because we
do not possess a platform from which to judge adequately whether mind and brain are to be regarded
as one or two (or even more) entities. This is where the old metaphysical claim that 'a predicate does
not confer existence' retains its force. Until further notice.

You will forgive me, I hope, if I sidestep Sartre's ideas of the ontology of art and leave this to
someone else to attend to. From my perspective, what Sartre contributes to this subject is
muddleheaded stuff; but this judgement relies on a conception of art which I defend, that goes against
the grain of what he and most writers on aesthetics conceive of as the relation between art and its
objects which (in my humble opinion) is incapable of resolving the dilemma of what kind of an object a
work of art is, ontologically speaking. (If you happen to have read Danto's Transfiguration of the
Commonplace,you might be aware that this confusion is endemic and getting worse instead of
better. Again, if you were to read Heidegger's 'Origin of the Work of Art' you might find that Sartre is
off on a tangent that somehow I don't feel Heidegger would approve of. But, sorry, this is where I'm
going to leave it.)

Jürgen Lawrenz

Sydney.

Interesting question, Malcolm. Have you looked at materialist theories of mind (such as Armstrong's A
Materialist Theory of Mind)? Armstrong came up with "The mind-brain identity theory" in which he
stated that the human mind and the human brain are identical. By this he did not mean that they
shared the same properties (like identical twins) but that they were in fact exactly the same thing, in
much the same way as "John Howard" and "Australia's current Prime Minister" are identical

Lyn Renwood