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Michael also asked:

Suppose we are sitting together talking and I produce a living rabbit. Then I cut the rabbit in half, right
down the middle. Now we look at both halves of the rabbit and I ask you, "Now where is the rabbit?"
Further suppose you decide to answer me, "There is no rabbit, only 2 half rabbits." Next I produce
another rabbit and this time I cut off exactly on fourth of the rabbit. I produce a third rabbit cutting off
exactly one eighth and ask the same question and I get the same answer. Finally, with one rabbit I
just trim the end of one toe nail and I point at the rabbit and the piece of toenail that I have removed
and again ask, "Where is the rabbit?'

This experiment makes it clear to me that what I am commonly calling a rabbit is a completely
arbitrary definition of something that, in fact, never exists. The actual thing I am referring to when I
say "rabbit" is just a mental image that does not actually correspond to anything of a real nature.

Suppose a coyote is eating a living rabbit. As we watch the rabbit eventually stops struggling and the
coyote devours the rabbit, piece by piece until everything has been consumed. When did the rabbit
go? At what point in this process did the rabbit cease to be? When the rabbit pieces are in the bowels
of the coyote they are digested into smaller and smaller pieces until finally they are decomposed into
their chemical constituents, absorbed and incorporated into the tissues of the coyote. It must be clear
that any choice we make about when the rabbit is and when it ceases to be is completely arbitrary.
Furthermore, what was once rabbit has become coyote. When it is one thing and when it becomes
the other is again completely arbitrary. Any choice that we make has no relationship to the actual
identity of the thing from the point of view of the Universe.

From the point of view of the Natural Order what we are calling a coyote and a rabbit are just porous
bags of molecules, sacks of energy wrapped by the sheerest gossamer netting. And these bags or
sacks may come close to each other and then move farther apart, at times commingling so intimately
that they seem to be one. But it is always a matter of distance, sometimes very short, sometimes
farther apart. It is always a continuum with no intrinsic borders, limits or boundaries. This
demonstrates clearly that there are no individual entities, only relative concentrations of energy
coming and going with extreme dynamism.

It becomes clear that from the point of view of the Universe there are no entities only actions, without
entities that do the acting. Second, any actions of ours that arise from an idea of self, where self is
different from some other, are actions based upon an illusion.

The examples address the issue of Entities, whether organismic or not. This separates in my mind
the issue of life versus death from the issue of whether the Self is an illusion because there are no
Entities.

============

What you're trying to tell me is that the universe is a seamless continuum of matter in which what
seem to us to be entities are merely local concentrations. This is an idea due to Heraclitus and
Parmenides, who lived about 2500 years ago. Another version of the same idea was taught by
Schopenhauer. Certain theories in modern particle physics permit that interpretation. So you see the
notion is both very old and tenacious.

However, to come to grips with the concept of entities and whether or not the notion of a 'self' relies
on it and therefore is an illusion, I will state the theory in your language:

The self is a local concentration ("focus") of a species "C" of the matter/energy continuum ("m/ec")
generated by a prior focus of m/ec of species "B" which in turn is the outcome of a preceding focus of
m/ec of species "M". To explain:

Species "M" or "matter" is characterised by spontaneous, repetitive, mechanical, predictable and
entropic congregation. This species (excluding any possible vacuum) accounts for more than 99.9%
of the volume of the universe. If an intelligence was provided with the initial atomic configuration of
this continuum, he would in principle be able to calculate the entire history of the universe, atom by
atom, through to its end, irrespective of any trends towards local concentrations.

Species "B" ("bio-organisms') is characterised by spontaneous, erratic, non-mechanical and
anentropic congregation. The same intelligence, if provided with the configuration of any congregation
whatever would be unable to predict at any instant in time what will occur at any later time, except in
some sub-species regarded as mass phenomena. The source of the erratic 'behaviour' is
non-normative chemical assembly resulting in an integrated work cycle ("iwc"). Another name for iwc
is 'metabolism', yet another 'homeostasis'. This species of the m/ec accounts for less than 0.1% of
the volume of the universe.

Species "C" is characterised by non-perceivability, for although certain concentrations of the
electro-magnetic spectrum are measurable, they attend but do not comprise Species "C". Moreover
"C" displays a property of unknown and unperceivable composition which may be surmised to be
responsible for firstly the erratic non-computable trends, secondly the anentropic (non-dissipatory)
coherence and thirdly the self-referential capability of "B". The coherence as icw's confers on these
focuses the status of "entity"; the self-referential attribute is commonly referred to as
"[self-]consciousness".

It is, however, an outcome of the existence of "C", notwithstanding that it is undetectable by objective
methods of assay, to confer on some members of "B" the aforementioned attribute of self-referential
consciousness. Accordingly the universe ipso facto contains focuses of consciousness conferring on
the universe itself the selfsame capacity within those local concentrations.

It is unknown whether or not these concentrations are dispersed across many localities of the
universe; it is also unknown whether they are subject to evolutionary development. Known traces of
these focuses account for an unknown percentage of the volume of the universe. It is a legitimate
conjecture that these traces occupy 0% of the volume of the universe.

Two deductions ensue from this analysis. Firstly: that although the last-named property of some
species in the universe account for 0% of m/ec, they comprise the only portion of local concentrations
where the universe may be said to hold a form of awareness of its own being. Secondly, since these
attributes are neither detectable nor manifest in any way whatever among any concentrations of "M",
the universe would if it lacked species "C" altogether, not be referentially cognisant of itself and
accordingly no avenue would be available to declare that it exists. Accordingly of a universe solely
comprised of "C" it may indiscriminately be said "it exists" or "it does not exist". The statements would
have identical meaning.

Reverting to common language: you can now deduce from the above (1) that "self" is not an entity but
a property of some entities; and (2) that entities exist.

It may help to note that entities are distinguishable from objects; indeed the term 'object' is
superfluous in this theory. Observe that your 'experiments' did not adequately differentiate these two
types of congregation of m/ec.

As a purely speculative aside, let me say that there is no good reason for believing that science has
cognisance of anything more than an infinitesimally small finite segment of the universe. The above
theory, to which I am not unsympathetic, may then invite consideration of the possibility that the
entropical drift (i.e. what stands behind big bang and big crunch theories) is just an effect suggested
by observable phenomena, whereas non-observable trends, e.g. the evolution of consciousness, may
be taking place at the same time, though unperceived. The universe may be in process not of burning
itself to a cinder, but of converting itself to a "thought", and even this is an old idea, mooted in 1930
by James Jeans.

Finally, it is plain from the above that the notion of 'illusion' would entail a circular definition; and from
this it follows that any tenable concept of 'illusion' can only be superadded as a special instance or
incidental feature of the operation of 'C'.

Jürgen Lawrenz

Sydney