Aleena asked:

Is it possible for a society to sustain itself and have a moral order without a religious foundation for
such an order?

Has there ever been a human society without a religion as the foundation for a moral order?

How do the alternatives (secular sources) for morality relate to the religious sources?

Which source (religious or secular) is superior or better in any way and why?

What are there so many difficulties in arriving at a definition of religion? What are the criteria or
considerations in developing a definition? What is religion?

How can one give a position in a distinctly and explicitly philosophical fashion, at the same time being
critical and comprehensive in developing and defending a position?

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That's a 'nasty' question, and without doubt essential.

First let's make the distinction between religion and belief.

The word religo' in Latin means to bind', that meaning speaks for itself.

My personal opinion is that religion' tends to absolutism', while beings need (relative) beliefs.

Or said in another way: 'God hates religion', or 'beliefs want to be free'.

Every knowledge-system is based on beliefs. That doesn't mean that it has to become 'religious'
(used in the sense of dogmatic), but the danger is always there. So to answer your first question: it is
possible, but it proved to be difficult.

The answer to your second question I don't know, but I fear not yet.

The alternatives for religion (or dogmatism, determinism, absolutism, fundamentalism) are in my
opinion found in relative views. Mind that there is nothing wrong with authoritarian knowledge, but it
should be compensated (otherwise teachers become gods). Giving an example would be wrong,
because not the view is important, but the way of viewing. Not necessary secular, because secular
beliefs can become very dogmatic (as proved in Stalinism).

In essence it is the controversy between Popper and Kuhn, or the distinction between absolute and
relative knowledge (Kuhn basing himself on Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein (possibly without
knowing) on Nietzsche. I respect very much both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, but both stressed
very much one side of the coin.

Any learning phase turns out to be mainly authoritarian (strict democracy in education failed), but
should be followed by using your own creativity. That's what Nietzsche stressed with his 'Superman',
he warned for religion but cherishes any free belief (even if he personally doesn't agree, but he
admires fanatic (but reasonable) defending of own convictions).

It's like studying philosophy and thirsty for knowledge drinking the views of your professors (but
hopefully mainly their methodology), and afterwards using the acquired knowledge to come to and
defend your owns views. So studying is not about copying views of your teachers, but learning the
means that are purposeful for you.

That's exactly what makes studying philosophy confusing. In most studies it is clear after ending that
have you learned various methods, but in philosophy there is always the danger as well of being
drowned in views. This is the 'religious' danger of philosophy, often without realizing you become
being 'bound' by the views of some professor and learn to defend those.

Henk Tuten

I suppose you are aware that your question entails a lifetime's worth of study!? To deal with such a
brief in a couple of paragraphs is simply not possible. The best, I feel, I can do for you in this
restricted compass is to make a few elementary points, hoping that someone qualified in theology will
add to it (and I take the risk of contradiction in my stride). So in relation to your first question, it is
indubitably possible to have a moral social order without a religious foundation. Not only is it possible,
but classical Chinese was a living example of it. Confucianism, although sometimes styled a secular
religion, was essentially a social structure based on humanitarian principles adopted from Confucius
and his followers (Mencius, Hsun Tsu) and adapted to the living needs of society. Its religious
component was restricted to the performance of certain rites, which were never in our (Christian)
sense religious, but a simple straightforward act of contemplation and human piety. Confucianism
was, whatever the actual practice may have changed from time to time, an essentially and intrinsically
secular doctrine and reigned as the dominant doctrine in China for nigh on 1500 years.

The others of your questions need to be addressed in a different kind of context. Whether religious or
secular structures are superior is, I think, a non-issue. If history may be asked to 'prove' anything at
all, then it can show at best that religion is 'good' only for two types of societies: those which are in an
anarchic shambles and need the cohesiveness of a single doctrine imposed from above, and those
societies which permit the individual the choice of their religion. China, ancient Greece and modern
Europe/America belong among the latter type.

The difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory definition of religion is, simply, that majority opinion is not a
philosophically relevant criterion. What we style 'higher religions' is, in my view, simple prejudice: we
represent a higher type of civilisation, ergo our religion must be higher. I stress that this is just my
opinion; and this pertains still when I add that the criticalreflection on religion cannot ignore the fact
that humans have throughout history (nomadic and prehistoric included) demonstrated a clear
propensity for anthropomorphic thinking: we followers of Jehovah and Christ delude ourselves that we
have a 'purer' concept; but against this it can be argued that (a) very little in the Christian
philosophical literature is clearly non-anthropic and the little there is has almost no influence on the
shape of the religion in either of its two major denominations; and (b) even the 'pure' concept cannot
claim intrinsic superiority to the simple shamanic conception of good and evil spirits residing in plants
and animals and human body parts. Pure or simplistic, both concepts have, criticallyassessed the
same validity; and if criticallyyou feel compelled to doubt one, then this automatically disqualifies the
other (assuming no bias intervenes). To some extent, I would argue that a criticalassessment of a
religion is a non sequitur in any case: religion is principally a matter of belief, in the second instance a
possibly metaphysical state of mind. But if one were to take the idea of a critique seriously, then you
would have to first disown religion and seeka rationale for believing in a God. You would find that, I
think, almost impossible.

Jürgen Lawrenz

Sydney