Philo
Sophos
·com

philosophy is for everyone
and not just philosophers

philosophers should know lots
of things besides philosophy


PhiloSophos knowledge base

Philosophical Connections

Pathways to Philosophy programs

Pathways web sites

Philosophy lovers gallery

Science, arts and humanities

PhiloSophos home

home first back 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 forward

Juan asked:

What is the meaning of knowledge?

============

Your question is concerned with one of the major divisions of philosophy, 'Epistemology.' Any answer
I can provide will certainly not be conclusive, and you will find that there are several alternatives.
Much depends on the standpoint from which one approaches the problem. The starting point of the
empiricist differs to that of the rationalist, the idealist, the materialist, and so on.

My favourite answer to the question is contained in the work of Bertrand Russell, who claims that
there are two sorts of knowledge; knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. Knowledge of things
is further sub-divided into knowledge by acquaintance,and knowledge by description.We can say
that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, and this is to understand
what might be called a pure awareness, without the addition of other sorts of knowledge or any truths.
In other words, knowledge we receive by way of the senses is givenknowledge and remains the
same to whichever mind it is presented. Hence, if I am in the presence of a chair I am acquainted with
the sense-data that make up the appearance of the chair, such as colour, shape, hardness,
smoothness, etc.. I strongly believe, but have no way of proving, that the very same sense data
generated by the chair would be received by any other human mind to which it was presented.

Although I can claim to have knowledge of the sense data representing the chair, there is no way in
which I can get beyond this sensa to the actual thing presenting the sense data. As I can only know
the chair by way of the given sensa, I can only have beliefs and assumptions about the realchair.
Russell called the received knowledge about the chair "knowledge by description." He further claims
that all the knowledge we posses started off as knowledge by acquaintance (bare sensa), both
knowledge of things and knowledge of truths.

Sense data then supply the most obvious and striking examples of knowledge by acquaintance. But if
they were the sole examples, our knowledge would be very much more restricted than it is. Only the
immediate data presented by our senses could be known, we would know nothing about the past, or
even that there was a past, nor could we know any truthsabout our sense data. Knowledge of truths
demands acquaintance with things which are of an essentially different character from sense-data,
things which are called abstract ideas(Universals).

We all have the ability to remember things, so we can claim that most of our sense data is confined to
memory. It follows that memory must refer to the past, remembering, then, is a further example of
knowledge by acquaintance, memories recalled to mind is knowledge of the past, i.e. knowledge of
things previously presented to the mind by acquaintance with sense-data, these would include
memories of objects and memories of events.

The deeper one investigates into the meaning of knowledge and the more complex it becomes, so we
should not be surprised when we find other layers of knowing, hence, we realise that we are aware of
'being aware,' when I see a tree I can be aware of 'seeing the tree.' This is a fascinating facet of
Philosophy of Mind; does one part of my mind observe the actions of another part, or is there an 'I'
separate from the mind which is aware of events in the mind? However, according to the present
thesis awareness of being aware is another case of knowledge by acquaintance. Russell called this
awareness by introspection.Our desires are things with which we are acquainted, as are our feelings
and sensations.

Memory is concerned not only with the past but also with the future. Aware of things and events that
can be repeated, we can extrapolate our experiences into the future, allowing us to anticipate, and to
direct our actions towards a purpose. Introducing 'will' and 'interest' into the subject of knowledge is a
further indication of the complexity of the subject. There are also variable approaches to life and
expectations based on different modes of up-bringing and environmental conditions. The knowledge
gained by a person brought-up in poverty and a restricted environment is 'coloured' differently to a
person raised in privileged and well-off conditions.

In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with
universals,as previously mentioned. These are general ideas such as whiteness, diversity,
relationship, etc.. Controversy about the use of language further complicates the problem of
knowledge, however, the consideration of language problems are an essential part of Philosophy of
Knowledge. The transfer of knowledge from one mind to another depends largely upon the proper
understanding and use of language; as does our construction of concepts.

If you wish to pursue the subject I recommend the following reading:

The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell, Oxford Paperbacks ISBN 0-19-888018-9.

The Problem of Knowledge A.J. Ayer, Penguin Books.

Mind and the World Order (Outline of a Theory of Knowledge) Clarence Irving Lewis, Dover
Publications ISBN 0-486-26564-1.

John Brandon