Amanda asked:

Do you think that the existence of evil is problematic? If, so how would you attempt to resolve it?
(Aurelius Augustinus)

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The existence of evil is not just problematic, it is a fundamental threat to the intelligibility of the world
and the pursuit of understanding.

To call an event 'evil' suggests that it cannot be situated in a narrative of our lives in the way a crime
or misdeed could. The evil undergone or committed by someone sets that person apart; they lie
beyond the limits of our understanding. What is characteristic of evil is that it is excessive,
overpowering attempts of comprehension — this conditions its dis-order, evil cannot be appropriated
into a scheme or framework of thought. Evil cannot be understood only suffered and this suffering is
useless or meaningless. There can be no explanation or justification of evil. This means that even
appeals to God's actions and/or plans are futile. In this sense the world must remain unintelligible.

This is the threat to the intelligibility of the world evil presents. There is also the threat to the pursuit of
understanding. If evil lies outside comprehension, if we cannot understand why children tortured (to
use Dostoevsky's Ivan example) then whatever else we do understand is worthless, it makes no
difference to these children whether I can explain why planes don't fall from the sky or why 2+2=4.
What's the point then of knowing about planes if it doesn't stop the torture?

Some may think I am committing a non-sequitur here: Just because some things are beyond
understanding it does not follow that we should give up the attempt to understand anything.

This objection is based on a view that holds epistemology and ethics separate, after the holocaust,
Hiroshima, and in the face of the power of evil I think this is a position we can no longer
unquestionably adopt. I am not suggesting that every piece of knowledge has to have some use and
be productive, I am suggesting that the pursuit of knowledge can no longer be separated from the
threat of evil, we can no longer be satisfied with knowing for knowing sake, we can no longer comfort
ourselves or hide in good conscience with the appeal: 'this work is for the benefit of mankind'. (See
Badiou's Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evilfor some — not necessarily convergent —
development of these ideas.)

There is a second objection against this view, that by viewing evil as unintelligible, beyond
comprehension I have given up any basis by which to confront evil: If we cannot understand the
causes and workings of evil how can we ever hope to eliminate evil?

What adequate response can we make then in the face of evil? One response is to adopt nihilism,
holding that because evil exists the world is fundamentally unintelligible and meaningless. However
what I want is a response that does justice to the reality of evil and yet makes it possible to reclaim
meaning.

From what will have been argued the answer will not be one based on cognition or comprehension, if
only because such explanations seek to encompass all events of evil in one wholly satisfactory
account, which it seems to me is wrong. Not allowing for difference and otherness in the world is one
of the processes evil-doers promote, to adopt the same strategy in opposing evil seems doomed to
failure.

The response then will be one based on action. I would argue however that opposition to evil couldn't
be meet with forceful (physical) action since this would ultimately necessitate more evil, but only with
what Levinas calls 'ethical resistance'. There are at least three kinds of ethical action: 1. Forgiveness
of evil 2. The possibility of redemption by atonement or making amends and 3. the Levinasian
concept of my infinite responsibility for the other, where my own suffering can be endured if it
alleviates an other's.

I don't know which of these or any combination of these would be successful, but I know that none of
them is an easy option.

Brian Tee