 |
No, I don't believe so. I think that perhaps the best notion of "predicative" might be found on p. 50 (of
the paperback translation, i.e., towards the end of pp 21 in the Second Meditation), where Husserl
speaks of "particularization". To predicate is to make explicit in a sense similar to "objectify" or
"particularize", where a sensation or act which is predicated is one which has been clearly
differentiated and categorized, differentiated from other sensations. That is, able to be made into a
predicate in a formal sense. You see? And so a pre-predicative judgment or perception is not so
much unconscious, as it is not fully differentiated, more vague, less objectified or isolated from other
judgments. Remember that Husserl's ultimate aim, as a former mathematician, was to place
philosophy on a footing similar to that of mathematics.
|