Chuck asked:

What is the importance, effectiveness and benefits of delegation to both the management and staff
within a closed paramilitary service such as a substantial Police Unit of 5,000 staff?

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I'm going to preface this with a warning that I've never worked in such a service, so my answer may
be completely off the wall. However, if I understand you correctly, you're asking about the chain of
command and about the nature of command in military organizations.

Let me start with the most general consideration: I think that it is an enormous tragedy that we must
have such organizations; an indictment of humanity. Yet the historical record assures us that a
military, and paramilitary police forces are necessary evils, i.e., that they are good in the sense of
being moral, like it or not. Why are they necessary? Human history is largely a record of violence.
There are various arguments to the effect that some societies have not been violent; that if we were
ruled by women we would not be violent, and so forth. All this may be true, but seems hardly relevant
against the great and horrible sweep of history. Such violence must be both combated and prevented,
and in the end, when someone is physically threatening you or your family, what response is there
but counterforce? Only the education of the young against violence works in the long term, and where
has that happened in human societies, and how have such societies dealt with external violence?

What should the nature of military hierarchies be? Again, given human "nature" as we know it, we find
that people are territorial and that they instinctively create dominance/submission hierarchies, as do
virtually all other animals on earth. We are not, by and large, rational; rationality is perhaps the most
difficult human attainment, and is usually achieved only temporarily and in restricted contexts. In an
ideal, rational, organization, in my opinion, everyone would have their place and status determined by
their demonstrated competence, and when told to do something by one more competent than
oneself, one might question and discuss their decision, but usually only to learn. In emergencies,
those less competent would quickly carry out the suggestions of those more competent. But again,
humans are not rational. We do not seem capable of this kind of behavior: the straightforward
acknowledgement of another's greater competence, and actions based on that acknowledgment.

It is my opinion that current military organizations go too far in both this internal force and in the
rigidity of their command structure. Such structures, I believe, should, in times of peace, be extremely
flexible so that competency is encouraged to rise to command. It is only in emergencies that the
structure should be fixed, for the duration of the emergency, to enable rapid responses. And after an
emergency is over, those in command should be evaluated by their peers to determine their
competency in emergency situations, and the hierarchy altered accordingly. Whether this is possible,
or to what extent it is possible, given the human limitations above, are questions I am not able to
answer.

Now, getting specifically to the issue of delegation. You see now what my answer will be. Usually, in
non-emergency situations, it is my opinion that there should be a great deal of delegation and indeed
altering of authority, i.e., of command hierarchies, for the purposes of training and evaluation of
competence in both emergency and non-emergency situations. However, the structure of the service
should be such that in an emergency the delegation either stops or is severely restricted, as quickly
as possible, in order to promote a rapid response to the emergency. Afterwards, normal flexibility
should resume.

I imagine that the above outline is radically different from the normal military structure... but it seems
to me the most effective in the long run. And in fact "battlefield promotions" are an accepted means of
rapidly altering command structures. I think, however, that such promotions — and demotions —
need to be carried out even more completely in non-emergency situations also.

Steven Ravett Brown