Stephen asked:

A friend once asked me if we can know whether or not our lives are actually real, or if we are merely
living in a dream.

I replied that there must be some reality to our lives. Why? Because we are able to ask the question.

Surely if our lives were actually no more than a dream, we would not be able to suspect anything
different. But, given that we are capable of asking this question, our consciousness must be sufficient
enough for our life to be more than 'a mere dream'.

I'm now trying to work out if there are any flaws in this argument.

In addition, although people in their dreams at night (and while awake, for some people) often 'reality
check' (i.e. pinch themselves) to determine if they are awake or asleep, surely to ask if their waking
life is itself a dream makes little sense. The concept of 'dreaming' (to most people) is surely derived
from reflecting on the dream state when awake (to contrast that state to their waking condition) —
and unless the person is actually aware of a waking state in contrast to a dreaming state, there can
be no conception of 'dreaming'. Hence, no 'dreaming' without a real life.

Thus, for a person to ask if their 'real life' is itself a dream seems like nonsense, as they have no
'higher reality' to compare it with. They would merely be using the analogy of dreaming (as contrasted
with everyday life), and applying it to everyday life (as contrasted with "X" — but with no
corresponding concept "X" at all).

My conclusion is that the question "Is everyday life just a dream?" is basically nonsense, and the
answer to it (if it can actually have an answer) is thus necessarily false.

Are there any objections to this line of reasoning?

(Of course, it is another question entirely to ask whether or not you are dreaming right now. In theory,
it is not possible to prove absolutely that you are not dreaming. In practice, however, most (sane)
people can distinguish between waking reality and dreaming in general, it seems, except under the
most unusual circumstances. It is also possible for people to learn how to dream lucidly, so they are
aware they are dreaming when in a dream. Surely this would lower the probability that a person is
actually dreaming without realising it. Philosophers seem to be far more concerned with the
theoretical possibility, however — however improbable this may be).

On a related point, I once heard of a philosophy student who had a mental breakdown and ended up
in a mental institution after hearing Descartes' "dreaming argument". He could no longer accept that
anything is real anymore, and so his reality simply fell apart. Perhaps this subject should carry some
form of 'health warning'? Just a suggestion.

============

I think your reasoning above is good. You have some good criticisms of the sceptics' claim that 'we
are always dreaming.' The only point of criticism I would make is that you say that what the sceptic
says is necessarily false and yet admit that the philosopher (who in this case is the philosophical
sceptic I take it) is concerned with improbable theoretical possibility. Now if the sceptic is saying
something that is theoretically possible then what they are saying cannot be necessarily false. That is,
what the sceptic is saying cannot be logically impossible. What the sceptic is saying may be plain
vanilla false though.

The sceptic may adjust the claim to 'we never know on any particular occasion whether we are
dreaming or not.' However, I think you could argue a case for being able tell the difference on any
particular occasion by using similar (everyday) considerations like the ones you mentioned above.

You note that the sceptic (philosophical sceptic that is as opposed to ordinary sceptic) is far more
concerned with theoretical possibility however improbable that may be, than most. This is because
the philosophical sceptic (Descartes was presenting the arguments of the philosophical sceptics in
Meditation I) want to claim that knowledge requires 'infallible' beliefs. Thus if there is any room for the
possibility of error then we cannot have knowledge. The ordinary sceptic claims, by contrast, that
knowledge does not require infallible beliefs.

If you want to take your reasoning a little further you might consider whether there is a difference
between what is possible and what makes sense to say. In considering what it makes sense to say
you would need to look at Wittgenstein's works especially On Certainty.You might also like to
consider whether things that make no sense to say i.e., are nonsense, are capable of being true or
false.

Finally, there is a remote danger of insanity arising out of reading Descartes but not one that warrants
a health warning. The best antidote to scepticism was found by David Hume — go out with your
mates and enjoy yourselves.

Julian Bennett

Well, take a look at the "brain in a vat" argument:

Brueckner, A.L. "Brains in a Vat." The Journal of Philosophy83, no. 3 (1986): 148-67.

Putnam, H. "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind." The
Journal of Philosophy91, no. 9 (1994): 445-517.

Then look at these:

Blakemore, S.-J., D.A. Oakley, and C. Frith. "Delusions of Alien Control in the Normal Brain."
Neuropsychologia41 (2003): 1058-67.

Spence, S.A. "Alien Control: From Phenomenology to Cognitive Neurobiology." Philosophy,
Psychiatry and Psychology8, no. 2-3 (2001): 163-72.

There are dreams in which we are aware that we're dreaming. In addition, there are dreams in which
we dream we are asleep. To put it explicitly, what you're touching on here is what is termed the
"skeptical" argument in philosophy, and you might take a look at Descartes' Meditationson whether
we know that there's a world out there. This is not exactly a question that philosophers have been
unaware of, over the last few millennia, but Descartes probably was the first to really get people upset
about it. There are many, many responses to Descartes. I'm not even going to give you references...
there are literally libraries of stuff on this question. Just go look him up, read him, then keep going.
Have fun!

Steven Ravett Brown

Your key argument looks suspiciously like the argument from polar conceptswhich enjoyed a brief
spell of popularity among Oxford philosophers in the 50's.

The form of the argument is this:

The concept of X implies a contrast with the concept of Y. (The concept of dreaming implies a
contrast with the concept of being awake.) Therefore, it is impossible that every case that occurs is in
fact a case of X and not of Y.

Here's a counterexample to that argument. Suppose some clever counterfeiters have managed to
pass a large number of counterfeit banknotes into circulation without detection. There is in fact no
way of telling by looking at a bank note whether it is counterfeit or genuine. Over a period of time, the
genuine notes go out of circulation until eventually all the bank notes in circulation are counterfeit.

What we can learn from this is that there is more to understanding the alternatives dreaming/ awake
or counterfeit/ genuine than simply appreciating the polarity or contrast. Genuine bank notes are
notes which have been printed and distributed by the government. That is a historicalfact about each
bank note, even if there is no way of deciding one way or the other by looking at the note itself.
(Faced with the alarming situation I have described the government could decide to 'make' the
counterfeit notes 'genuine' by an act of Parliament. But that would not alter the historical facts.)

Similarly (as Descartes believed) the fact that my present experience corresponds to an external,
material reality is a fact about its ultimate source which cannot be discovered by looking at the
character of the experience itself. There are arguments which one can use against this claim, but not
the argument from polar concepts.

Geoffrey Klempner