Stephen asked:

If we accept the notion that there are fixed 'laws of nature' (ignoring the excessively skeptical
approach of the likes of Hume), we can observe and test such laws, as far as they involve observable
actions and processes (as in scientific theories), and thus we may have reasonable inductive grounds
for believing in the existence of such laws.

However, it seems quite a different thing indeed to state that there are fixed metaphysical 'laws',
somehow analogous to the laws of science. Also, scientific laws of nature invariably measure
processes, and tend to concern "how" things happen, whilst metaphysics tends to be largely
concerned with the "what". If a scientific theory postulates the existence of an entity, it is to account
for an observable process. If a metaphysician posits a metaphysical entity, it is a different kettle of
fish altogether — most often based on intuition critically analysed within a conceptual framework in
the metaphysician's mind. Thus, although any such entities postulated by science may be viewed as
explanations of genuine observed 'laws of nature', any entities postulated by metaphysicians are
inescapably bound to the human thinker's perception of the world, and thus have absolutely nothing
whatever to say about an actual 'nature of reality', and certainly not a 'law of nature' (a 'how'), as the
metaphysical hypothesis is an attempt to describe the 'what'.

Although this may be getting dangerously close to a logical positivist view, which states that
metaphysics is nonsense, the claim I am making here is not that metaphysics is worthless, but rather
that even the best metaphysical hypothesis which could be proposed says nothing whatsoever about
the 'nature of reality', but instead merely critically assesses the human perception of such a said
'reality', from a purely anthropocentric point of view.

Although scientific theories may be inescapably anthropocentric to some degree, they do succeed in
describing phenomena from some kind of objective stance, happily divorced from the human mental
perception of the events observed. Metaphysical speculations, on the other hand, are purely
anthropocentric, and thus cannot hope to describe any more than a purely human perception of a
"reality", and certainly NOT any such "reality" itself.

So my tendency is towards a naturalistic approach to metaphysics (which may be great towards
philosophy's contribution to, say, cognitive science, in understanding human concepts from a
naturalistic point of view). The conception that there are actual metaphysical 'laws' (or 'facts'), though,
does not seem (to me) to have any firm base on which to stand. In speculating about what "actually
is" metaphysically, as if we can actually describe a "nature of reality", we seem to be ridiculously
optimistic about the potential of human understanding, and it seems foolhardy to imagine that we can
actually know about such things.

(I seem to be reverting to a rather Humean naturalistic skepticism at this point.)

My claim, therefore, is that there is no such thing as a metaphysical law, as analogous to a scientific
law, and thus that metaphysics at best describes nothing more than laws of human cognition (which,
of course, is still an important area of study — it may not be possible to understand reality per se, but
only OUR reality, which may be all that really matters in the end...:-))

Can someone critique my views on these issues?

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Well, where do we start?! You are raising the entire philosophical debate on 'reality'. This is covered
by several authors, several commentators, and some of the greatest philosophers the world has ever
known. You state your own position quite clearly, and I can sympathise with some of what you say.

Laws of nature are not fundamental in the sense that we have proof that 'nature' is in any way
responsible for establishing its own laws. What we do have are notions about laws derived from
alleged empirical evidence. Perhaps, as you say, on the face of it there seems to be grounds for
inductive reasoning about such laws. However, it is induction about notions, and does this not take us
into metaphysics? Where is the border-line between what we understand as metaphysical
contemplation and what we consider to be inductive reasoning about hypotheses? Hypotheses and
theories are in themselvesa prioriassertions, the fact that they are constructs of scientific reasoning
does not in any way endorse them with empirical veracity.

In fact, scientists themselves are now beginning to question the notion of an objective reality since the
massive paradigm shift, caused first by the quantum theory and the subsequent emergence of the
superstring concept. We would be hard put to it to deny that science was now in the realms of
metaphysics. In which domain should we place parallel universes? It is indeed science that is
discussing them!! It is many years now since physicists watched with amazement as matter reduced
to energised particles then to photons of light, they were even more surprised to note particles
appearing in cloud chambers where no matter had previously existed. All this drove one great
physicist to declare that the universe was a great 'thought' rather than a great machine.

Perhaps you should be referring to 'rules' rather than laws; in which case it seems legitimate to
discuss metaphysics within the accepted rules of logic, the simplest case being that conclusions must
follow from premisses. This would of course be true for both scientific hypotheses and metaphysical
concepts. It could also be pointed out that many propositions in science, just as in metaphysics are
conditional, in other words, of the form, 'If X then Y'.

I agree that science tends to measure things, and makes statements about construction and location,
this is, of course, working with superficial sense data, well below the level of 'explanation' and
'understanding', where both science and metaphysics require to construct acceptable arguments. I do
not agree that metaphysics has nothing to say about the 'nature of reality', as even a superficial study
of some of the great thinkers bears out: Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, to name but a few. The
views of all these philosophers still cause many scientists to feel more than a little uncomfortable with
the empirical and basic materialist notion of the 'nature of reality'. I also disagree with your suggestion
that metaphysics has no interest in the question' How?' How did the universe come into being? Has
intriguing links with non-causal speculation, quite opposed to scientific concerns with the necessity of
causation in all material events.

I also challenge the idea that scientific theories describe phenomena objectively, divorced from
mental perception. Scientists work from sense data enhanced by mental constructs. Bare sense data
without mental manipulation has very little meaning. We can say that scientific theories themselves
are mental constructs tested against empirical evidence.

The subsequent paradigms through which humanity has progressed are basically theoretical
constructs within which science attempts to work. There was a time when anyone arguing against a
flat earth would have been considered to be mad, every bit of available sense data completely
supported the 'fact', and no doubt the 'natural laws' were there to give full support. Evolution has
remained a theory for over a hundred years, within which science has presented an illusion of
development. The 'Big Bang' is a theory which forms a basis for cosmological adventures. Quantum
theory is the basis of our rapidly developing new paradigm. Like all paradigms it may possibly
self-destruct in the light of the foundations for a new paradigm. At the end of it all we shall still be
questioning Kant's 'things in themselves', metaphysicians will still be seeking to know 'what there is'.
Berkeley will still be posing the question, 'Is there really anything out there?' Science will still be
involved with its reductionism, whilst philosophy continues to point out that there is more to life than
'particles', and all known objects are more than the sum of their parts, particularly life forms.

John Brandon

Sure. You're starting with many metaphysical assumptions. You state:

"1) If we accept the notion that there are fixed 'laws of nature' (ignoring the excessively skeptical
approach of the likes of Hume), 2) we can observe and test such laws, as far as they 3) involve
observable actions and processes (as in scientific theories), and thus we may have reasonable 4)
inductive grounds for believing in the 5) existence of such laws."

I count five assumptions just off the top of my head in that first sentence, all of which have been
debated, some for merely a century or so, and some for thousands of years. But if you make those
assumptions (which I've really not exhaustively analyzed — for example, just what does "reasonable"
mean?) then yes, I agree with your conclusion... I think. I'm actually not really sure just what you
meanby the term "metaphysics", except inasmuch as it relates to yourassumptions. And by making
those assumptions, you've pretty much closed the door on the possibility of othermetaphysics, and
thus I imagine of "metaphysical laws". But again, since those assumptions you're making are
metaphysical, then laws following fromthem are metaphysical. Thus, what you term "inductive
grounds" are in fact metaphysical laws, are they not? And so forth.

Steven Ravett Brown

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