Harriet asked:

Why did emotivism come into existence?

And which philosophers deal with it and what points do they make?

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Emotivism as an ethical theory (better a meta-ethical) theory is very much a creature of the 1930s
and 40s. A version was espoused by the young Ayer in Language Truth and Logicthough the fullest
expression of the theory is to be found in the work of C.L. Stevenson. His classic text is Ethics and
Language.There is a related set of collected articles by Stevenson entitled Facts and Values
published in the early 1960s elaborating and refining some of the key themes associated with
emotivism. Emotivism can be seen as a reaction against the ethical intuitionism of the early 20th
century associated with G.E. Moore, and later, Ross and Prichard.

Justifiably or not, it was seen as leaving too much as too mysterious. The dogma that one cannot
derive an ought from an is had been given compelling expression by Moore and formed the backcloth
against which all subsequent reflections on the nature of ethics had taken place. Emotivists while
accepting the naturalistic fallacy nevertheless recognised that moral discourse was directed —
importantly, if not entirely — to influencing the actions and behaviour of others. They looked to the
dynamic nature of moral discourse as holding the key to how it shaped and influenced others' actions
and behaviours. Roughly to say X is good is to say 'I approve of X. Do so as well' This pattern of
analysis did justice (so it was claimed) to both the descriptive and evaluative dimensions of moral
language while at the same time avoiding any tendency to suppose the evaluative dimension is
derived from the descriptive element informing others about attitudes towards X.. Ethical discourse in
other words worked through the exciting of shared attitudes. Hare's later prescriptivism can be seen
as a sophisticated variant upon emotivism.

A critique of this whole programme is beyond the remit of this answer but fairly clearly the plausibility
of this approach turns upon 1. being prepared to accept that there is one peculiar function (the
shaping of attitudes towards actions etc) that distinguished moral discourse from other kinds of
discourse and 2. that our natural belief rational debate can be had on moral matters is quite
misconceived as moral debate is really about persuading individualsno matter howto come to share
your attitude towards a certain action or state of affairs. The merest perusal of the uses to which
moral discourse is put will show the implausibility of the former suggestion. And we are reluctant to let
go of the distinction between considerations that reason should recognise and those that merely
persuade us, irrespective of their rationality . The analysis proffered by emotivists of the nature of
moral discourse seems to do too much violence to the nature of that discourse.

Ian Gregory

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