Philo
Sophos
·com

philosophy is for everyone
and not just philosophers

philosophers should know lots
of things besides philosophy


PhiloSophos knowledge base

Pathways to Philosophy programs

Pathways web sites

Philosophy lovers gallery

Science, arts and humanities

PhiloSophos home

home first back 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 forward

Ryan asked:

Eliminating the soul. If two people (twins clones whatever) share the exact same experiences would
they be the same person?

Any "no" or contrasted answers to this question would be greatly appreciated.

============

No, they would not. For apart from being souls, they are also objects, and as such they cannot pursue
the identical trajectory in spacetime. This is not contradicted by those rare instances of twin bodies
being joined to each other, like the twins who recently made the headlines. At the microscopic level,
for all that they may have shared the same genes, implementation (or translation) will produce
(large-scale) errors on an individual cell by cell basis, and by that fact alone, even clones would differ
from each other at least in the way they suffer the same experiences. It is possible, perhaps, that
subjectively the two may believe in the identity of their shared experiences. But I doubt it: for at the
very least the case I alluded to shows that their experience of right and left must be incompatible.

Jürgen Lawrenz

70